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There is nothing primitive about a State Constitution. It is based upon the pre-existing laws, rights habits, and modes of thought of the people who ordained it, * * *and must be construed in the light of this fact. Commonwealth v City of Newport News, 164 S.E. 689, 696 (1932).

The purpose and intent of a written constitution is to preserve the ancient rights held at common law, and constitutional provisions are to be so interpreted (See, American Jurisprudence, 2nd Ed., Vol. 16, ' 321). It thus becomes plain that all rights that the people inherently possessed when Connecticut was a Colony, were secured by the Constitution of Pennsylvania when adopted. That the right to freely travel, by what ever means available, on public ways had existed at that time cannot be doubted. The people who adopted the Constitution certainly did not “surrender” their liberty to freely travel by becoming citizens and/or residents of Connecticut. In fact they made sure that the Constitution would “secure the same to ourselves and our posterity.” This is the main reason why the Constitution was “ordained and established” (I bid).

This principle, along with the broad meaning of “liberty,” were evidently not understood by the trial court. Defendant would have prohibiting the State from restricting his right to travel via licensing. Thus, the trial court believes that if a right is not exactly spelled out in the Constitution (such as the right to travel), then it constitutionally does not exist. It has been held by a sister State, Minnesota Supreme Court that citizens possess such rights whether they are enumerated in a constitution or not:

The rights, privileges, and immunities of citizens exist notwithstanding there is no specific enumeration thereof in state constitutions. These instruments measure the powers of rulers, but they do not measure the rights of the governed.* * *The constitution of Minnesota specifically recognizes the right to “life, liberty or property,” but does not attempt to enumerate all “the rights or privileges secured to any citizen thereof” It, however, significantly provides: “The enumeration of rights in this constitution shall not be construed to deny or impair others retained by and inherent in the people.” Thiede v. Town of Scandia Valley, 217 Minn. 218, 225; 14 N.W. 2d 400 (1944).

It should be quite obvious from the forgoing authorities that a citizen does have an inalienable and Constitutional right to travel on the public highways, which includes the use of an automobile as a means of conveyance. This means the State Legislature cannot impair or suspend this Constitutional right or prohibit the Defendant from exercising it.

We realize that the police is elastic to meet changing conditions and changing needs, yet it cannot be used to abrogate or limit personal liberty or property rights contrary to constitutional sanction. City of Cincinnati v. Correll, 49 N.E. 2d 412, 414; 141 Ohio St. 535.

By the expression “constitutional right,” as just used, we mean a right guaranteed to the citizen by the Constitution and so guaranteed as to prevent legislative interference with that right. Delaney v. Plunkett, 91 S.E. 561; 146 Ga. 547.

The right to travel on the land was an inherent right, which had existed before the adoption of Connecticut’s Constitution. This right includes all modes of travel, whether by horse, wagon, or carriage, or by walking, and also includes automobiles (not for gain) since they have “equal rights” with other modes of travel. Thus, the defendant is here again claiming and asserting his inalienable and constitutional right to travel on the public roads of this land, whether on foot, or by bicycle, or automobile or other means of conveyance existing or yet to be discovered. This is a right under the Constitution of Connecticut, which this court is bound to uphold and protect.

Hey, you don’t require soldiers to have driver licenses? It’s a denial of equal protection to license some but not others.

Defendant already possess an inherent and constitutional right to travel and that the statutes would be an invasion and trespass on his rights. This trespass would of course be unconstitutional. Thus, while the statute used against the defendant may be constitutionally applied to certain individuals under certain circumstances, they are invalid as they are applied to and enforced upon the defendant. So even though the statutes themselves may be valid when applied to certain persons, such as those involved in commerce, for profit, they cannot be lawfully applied to the defendant due to the legal facts surrounding this case(e.g. defendant’s rights, status, etc.). This legal reasoning has been upheld in a sister State Supreme Court:

We have held in a number of cases that an ordinance may be reasonable and proper as applied to one set of facts and arbitrary and invalid when enforced under other circumstances. State v Perry, 204, 207 (1964).

This case involves the invasion and violation of constitutional rights. These rights are the supreme law of the State. The burden on the State is great.

We demand the same standard as for speech. Most folks would rather go a day without talking than lose their driving privileges for a day. It’s that important.

Where fundamental personal liberties are involved, they may not be abridged by the States simply on a showing that a regulatory statute has some rational relationship to the effectuation of a proper state purpose. Where there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling. City of Carmel-By-The-Sea v. Young, 466 P.2d 225, 232; 85 Cal. Rept. 1 (1970).

The constitutional rights of liberty and property may be limited only to the extent necessary to subserve the public interest. Cameron v. International Alliance, Etc., 176 Atl. 692, 700; 118 N.J. Eq. 11 (1935).

A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful. Payne v. Massey, 196 S.W. 2d 493; 145 Tex. 237, 241.

The purpose of a license is to make lawful what would be unlawful without it. State v. Minneapolis- St. Paul Metro Airports Commission, 25 N.W. 2d 718, 725.

A license is a right granted by some competent authority to do an act which, without such license, would be illegal. Beard v. City of Atlanta, 86 S.E. 2d 672, 676; 91 Ga. App. 584.

A license confers the right to do that which without the license would be unlawful. Antlers Athletic Ass’n v. Hartung, 274 P. 831, 832; 85 Colo. 125

A license is a mere permit to do something that without it would be unlawful. Littleton v. Burgess, 82 P. 864, 866; 14 Wyo. 173.

Generally, a license is a permit to do what, without a license, would not be lawful. Bateman v City of Winter Park, 37 So. 2d 362, 363; 160 Fla. 906.

Definition: License: A permission, accorded by a competent authority, conferring the right to do some act which without such authorization would be illegal, or wold be a trespass or a tort. Black’s Law Dicti0onary, 2d Ed. P. 723 (1910).

Where this court/tribunal may be correct in asserting that the defendant is required to have a “driver’s License,” it must be then, according to the above authorities, because it is “unlawful” for him to freely travel in his automobile on the public roads. However, the foregoing cases show that the automobile, as a means of conveyance, is just as lawful as traveling on foot, horse, or bicycle since their rights are mutual, equal, and coordinate-a right, which was secured by the Constitution of Connecticut. Thus, the use of an automobile is lawful because it involves the exercise of a Constitutional Right, and the legislature cannot make the exercise of such a right unlawful by requiring a license of citizens (Americans) before allowed to exercise that right. It has been well settled that it is lawful for a citizen to travel using an automobile as a means of conveyance.

Automobiles are lawful vehicles and have equal rights on the highway with horses and carriages, * * *. Daily v. Maxwell, 133 S.W. 351, 354; 152 Mo. App. 415.

Automobiles are a lawful means of conveyance, and have equal rights upon the public roads with horses and carriages * * *. Shinkle v. McCullough, 77 S.W. 196, 197; 116 Ky. 960; Christy v. Elliott, 74 N.E. 1037, 1041; 216 Ill. 31; Fletcher v. Dixon, 68 Atl. 875, 877 (Md.)

Under the principles and rules of the common law, automobiles should be recognized as lawful vehicles. Sapp v. Hunter, 115 S.W. 463, 466, 134 Mo. App. 685

The case history of the automobile shows that it has always been lawful to travel on the public roads and streets with an automobile. The obvious reason why it is lawful to travel on the public roads by whatever means of conveyance available is that the public roads belong to the people or the public generally and were established or dedicated for the purpose of common travel.

The streets of a city belong to the people of the state, and every citizen of the state has a right to the use thereof. Ex parte Daniels, 183 Cal. 636, 639.

It is well established law that the highways of the state are public property; and their primary and preferred use is for private purposes; * * *. Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251, 264.

A highway belongs to the public, and is free and common as a way to every citizen on the land. House-Wives League v. City of Indianapolis, 204 Ind. 685, 689.

It is settled that the streets of a city belong to the people of a state and the use thereof is an inalienable right of every citizen of the state. Whyte v. City of Sacramento, 65 Cal. App. 534, 547.

The public highways belong to the people for use in the ordinary way. Barney v. Board of Railroad Com’rs, 17 Pac. 2d 82, 85 (Mont.-1932)

The streets of the city belong to the public. For ordinary use and general transportation and traffic, they are free and common to all, and any control sought to be exercised over them must be such as will not defeat or seriously interfere with their enjoyment. Melconian v. Grand Rapids, 188 N.W. 521, 524.

The streets belong to the public, the city being its trustee,* * *. Green v. City of San Antonio, 178 S.W. 6, 9.

Some would say that the right to travel is limited to travel without a car. They are wrong.

To make travel by automobile unlawful (by requiring a license) would violate the concept that their use as a means of conveyance is to be equal with citizens using other modes of conveyance. Where a driver’s license is valid against the defendant, there would now exist a “distinction” as to the degree of right to the use of the public roads for travel. Other modes of travel are not to have a superior right in the use of public ways over one using a specific mode of conveyance:

Persons making use of horses as a means of travel or traffic by the highways have no rights therein superior to those who make use of the ways in other modes,* * * Improved methods of locomotion are perfectly admissible if any shall be discovered, and they cannot be executed from the existing public roads* * * A highway is a public way for the use of the public in general, for passage and traffic, without distinction. Macomber v. Nichols, 34 Mich, 212, 216, 22 Am. Rep. 522.

But the streets of a city may be as freely used by those who ride in automobiles as by pedestrians or travelers. Corcoran v. City of New York, 188 N.Y. 131, 139.

There is no doubt that the owners of automobiles have the same rights in the streets and highways of the State that the drivers of horses have. Wright v Crane, 142 Mich. 508, 510.

Automobiles* * * are lawful vehicles and as such are entitled to the privilege of using the public highways. Their drivers have equal rights with the occupants of wagons, carriages, and other vehicles. Hall v. Compton, 130 Mo. App. 675, 680.

Where automobiles are a lawful means of travel, and where they have the same rights upon the road as more ancient means of travel, then how can it be it that one must have a license before being allowed to travel in an automobile? Could one be required to have a license to travel by wagon, by horseback, by foot, or by boat on a river? All of history declares that as new modes of travel, possessing the natural, fundamental right to be used for travel:

If there is any one fact established in the history of society and of the law itself, it is that the mode of exercising this easement [highways] is expansive, developing, and growing as civilizations. In the most primitive state of society the conception of a highway was merely a footpath; in a slightly more advanced state it included the idea of a way for pack animals-constituting, respectively, the “iter,” the “actus,” and the ”via”of the Romans. And thus the methods of using public highways expanded with the growth of civilization, until today our urban highways are devoted to a variety of uses not known in former times. Carter v Northwestern Telephone Exch. Co., 60 Minn. 539, 63 N.W. 111; Molway v. City of Chicago, 88 N.E. 485, 486, 239 Ill. 4.

It is now well settled by all the courts that automobiles are lawful modern modes of travel and convenience, and that they have the same right upon the public highways as any other means of conveyance.* * * In all human activities the law keeps up with the improvements and progress brought about by discovery and invention. Riley v. Fisher, 146 S.W. 581, 583 (Tex. Civ. App.).

The point made here is that all modes of travel have an equal right to freely use the public roads for common travel. In Thompson v. Dodge, 58 Minn. 555, the Minnesota Supreme Court had pointed out this principle by showing that “A person riding a bicycle upon the public highways has the same rights in so doing as persons using other vehicles thereon.” It also pointed out that an older form of travel, “has no right superior” to the more modern forms of conveyance because “the rights of each are equal.” Thus, the legislature cannot make it unlawful for a citizen to travel on the public highways when using an automobile (or a light weight pick-up vehicle use for personal conveyance, not for gain) by compelling one to take out a “driver’s license,” thereby stating it is unlawful to travel in that mode and putting a burden one not on other Americans.

To compel one who uses his automobile for his private business and pleasure only, to submit to an examination and to take out a license (if the examining board see fit to grant it) is imposing a burden upon one class of citizens in the use of the streets, not imposed upon the others. We must therefore hold this ordinance, so far as it obliges appellee to take out a license before he can use his own automobile in his own business or for his own pleasure, is beyond the power of the city counsel, and is therefore void. City of Chicago v. Banker, 112 Ill. App. 94, 99-100.

This same legal principle is applicable in this case. The Defendant can lawfully travel in his automobile due to his Constitutionally guaranteed right to do so. This right he has equally with all citizens/Americans using the public road for travel. These principles would be abrogated if he is compelled to take out a license.

A further study into the nature of a “license” will continue to show that the defendant is not required to have a license to travel in his automobiles, and thus does not come under the purview of Title14, where the defendant is required to have a driver’s license in the Connecticut General Statutes. This is due to the fact that a license can only grant or confer a right or privilege, which does not legally exist without a license.

The object of a license is to confer a right or power which does not exist without it. Payne v. Massey, 196 S.W. 2d 493; 145 Tex. 237, 241.

To license means to confer on a person the right to do something which otherwise he would not have the right to do. City of Louisville v. Sebree, 214 S.W. 2d 248, 253; 308 Ky. 420.

The object of license is to confer right or power which does not exist without it and exercise of which without license would be illegal. Inter-City Coach Lines v. Harrison, 157 S.E. 673, 676; 172 Ga. 390.

According to these authorities, a “driver’s license” apparently grants or confers some sort of right or privilege. A driver’s license then can only be required of someone who does not have an inherent right to use the public roads. The defendant, as previously shown, already possesses an inalienable and constitutional right to use the public roads in his travels, and therefore does not need to secure the right to do so by way of a license.

A license is a privilege granted by “the State,”* * *To constitute a privilege, the grant must confer authority to do something which, without the grant, would be illegal; for if what is to be done under the license is open to every one without it, the grant would be merely idle and nugatory, conferring no privilege whatever. A license, therefore implying a privilege, cannot possibly exist with reference to something which is a right, free and open to all, as is the right of the citizen to ride and drive over the streets of the city without charge and without toll. City of Chicago v. Collins et al, 51 N.E. 907, 910.

The driver’s license, as it applies to the defendant, is “merely idle and nugatory” because the right it confers, or pretends to confer, are already “free and open” to him as an inherent right by the Connecticut Constitution. The driver’s license cannot possibly grant the Connecticut a right to travel on the public roads, when he already possesses an inherent right to do so. It has been said that “the individuals ordinary right to the free use of the streets” for travel “cannot be taken from him” See State v. McCarthy, 171 So. 314, 316 (Fla.-1936). Where a State can require an American/citizen to obtain a license before he is allowed to travel, the State has effectually taken his right to travel away from him.

The only persons that the courts have repeatedly recognized as having no inherent right to use an automobile on a public road are those who are engaged in commercial activity; such as common carriers, truck drivers, chauffeurs, taxi drivers, etc. See Title 18 United States Code §31. In other words, those who use the public roads for business or personal gain have no inherent right to use the roads as such. They therefore are subject to licensing because their use of the road is special and extraordinary and can be deemed unlawful. The courts have repeatedly shown the distinction between the rights of citizens using the roads for common travel from one using them for commercial purposes:

The right of a citizen to travel upon the highway and transport his property thereon, in the ordinary course of life and business, differs radically and obviously from that of one who makes the highway his place of business and uses it for private gain, in the running of a stage coach or omnibus. The former is the usual and ordinary right of a citizen, a common right, a right common to all, while the latter is special, unusual and extraordinary. As to the former, the extent of legislative power is that of regulation; but, as to the latter, its power is broader, the right may be wholly denied, or it may be permitted to some and denied to others, because of its extraordinary nature. This distinction, elementary and fundamental in character, is recognized by all he authorities. Ex parte M.T. Dickey, 76 W. Va. 576, 579; 85 S.E. 781 (1915); Cited by: Schultz v. City of Duluth, 163 Minn. 65, 69, 203 N.W. 449; Scott v. Hart, 128 Miss. 353; State v. Johnson, 75 Mont. 240; Cummings v. Jones, 79 Ore. 276, 280; Hadfield v. Lundin, 98 Wash. 657; et al.

In a case involving a person engaged in transporting property under contract for hire by truck on the highways, the Supreme Court of Montana revealed the nature of such activity in comparison to one using the roads for travel:

While a citizen has the right to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, that right does not extend to the use of the highways, either in whole or in part, as a place of business for private gain. For the latter purposes no person has vested right in the use of the highways of the state, but is a privilege or license which the Legislature may grant or withhold in its discretion, or which it may grant upon such conditions as it may see fit to impose. Barney v. Board of Railroad Com’rs, 17 Pac. 2d 82, 85 (Mont.-1932).

It has been said, “a license to operate an automobile is not property, but a mere privilege.” This is true, all licenses are a privilege. But nowhere does it say that travel in an automobile is a mere privilege. The Legislature cannot make travel upon the roads and highways conditional upon the obtaining of a license, because the act of ordinary travel is not a privilege but an ordinary right. The Legislature can, however, require a license for one using the roads for profit for such use is a privilege:

The use of the streets as a place of business or as a main instrumentality of business is accorded as a mere privilege and not as a matter of natural right. Reo Bus Line Co. v. Bus Line Co., 272 S.W. 18, 20, 209 Ky. 40.

The Appellant/Defendant has never used his automobile for private gain or commercial activity on the public roads, but rather was using his inherent right to travel thereon prior to his arrest. Even though this fact is true and correct, the Appellant/Defendant does not deal with any type of commerce with his automobile for gain. Cases such as: Chicago v. Collins, Thompson v. Smith, House v. Cramer, et al., are not related to interstate commerce or even interstate travel.

The Driver’s License is of a commercial nature and character. Such licenses are and can only be used to grant permission to one using the roads in a commercial capacity, and have no relation to their use in the exercise of the fundamental right to travel:

The ordinary use of the streets by the citizens is an inherent right which cannot be taken from him by the city and may only be controlled by reasonable regulation, while the right to use the streets for conducting thereupon a private business of any character is not an inherent or vested right and can only be acquired by permission or license form the city. Davis v. City of Houston, 264 S.W. 625, 629 (Tex. Civ. App.); State v. Quigg, 114 So. 859, 862 (Fla.-1927). See Also: Lane v. Whitaker, 275 F. 476, 480.

The Appellant, prior to his arrest, was traveling in his Toyota, a 1989, on the public roads in Connecticut by common law right, and thus having equal rights with other travelers, such as pedestrians, bicyclists, horse and carriages, etc., all of which have an inalienable right of free passage on the public road. Therefore, the defendant needs no license to obtain a right (free passage on a public road) he already possesses. The State cannot compel the Appellant to acquire a license before he is allowed to exercise his constitutional right of liberty and to travel. This same principle holds true regarding the exercise of all constitutional rights there can be no license required before they are allowed to be exercised. For instance, in a case regarding the right of freedom of the press, the United States Supreme Court held that a law, which prohibits the distribution of printing materials except by license, is invalid. The Court stated, to wit:

We think that the ordinance is invalid on its face. Whatever the motive which induced its adoption, its character is such that it strikes at the very foundation of the freedom of the press by subjection it to license and censorship. The struggle for the freedom of the press was primarily directed against the power of the licensor. It was against that power that John Milton directed his assault by his “Appeal for the Liberty of Unlicenced Printers.” Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1937); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1939).

Regarding the constitutional right to freedom of speech, Justice Douglas had stated in a U.S. Supreme Court decision that: “No one may be required to obtain a license in order to speak.” Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 543 (1944). Thus, “The State” can no more license the Appellant’s right to travel in his automobile than it could license his right to print or speak, for they are all inalienable rights.

The reason a right cannot be licensed is that the license (a statutory right) would require the Appellant to surrender his inalienable right in lieu thereof, just to obtain permission (i.e. license) to do what he already has a right to do. The State has no power to compel a citizen to surrender an inalienable right:

Inalienable, means incapable of being surrendered or transferred, at least without one’s consent. Morrison v. State, Mo. App. 252 S.W. 2d 97, 101.

The right of liberty and the right to move from place to place are natural and inalienable rights, endowed to us by our Creator, and secured by the Constitution of Connecticut. They thus are rights that the Defendant possesses and he refuses to surrender or transfer such rights to the State by way of licensing.

In Ex parte Dickey, supra, et al., the court pointed out the distinction in legislative power over a citizen using the public roads for ordinary travel, over one using them in a commercial capacity. The courts holding is: “As to the former (the citizen using the road for common travel) the extent of legislative power is that of regulation; but, as to the latter, its power is broader, the right may be wholly denied, or it may be permitted to some and denied to others.” We see that the legislature has the power to preclude or prevent those engaged in commercial activity from being on the public roads, but no such power is extended over the citizenry using it for ordinary travel. In this case the legislative power is limited to mere regulation.

Where a citizen is required to have a license before he can travel anywhere in the several States, the licensor has

absolute power and control over his/her liberty to travel, to earn a living, transport his property, etc. The licensor (The Department of Motor Vehicles) would then have complete authority not only to grant, but also to prevent, revoke, or prohibit an American and/or citizen’s liberty and right to travel

A license means leave to do a thing which the licensor could prevent. Blatz Brewing Co. v. Collins, 160 P.2d 37, 39, 69 C.A. 2d 639; Western Electric Co. v. Pacent Reproducer Corp., 43 F.2d 116, 118.

The authority to license implies the power to prohibit, such being the meaning of the term. The City of Burlington v. Bumgardner, 42 Iowa 673, 674.

A license, pure and simple, is a mere personal privilege, and it is revocable at law, at the pleasure of the licensor, even when money has been paid for it. River Development Corp. v. Liberty Corp., 133 A.2d 373, 385; 45 N.J. Super. 445.

The power of the legislature over the common travel of citizens extends only to such reasonable regulations that would promote safe travel for all. It never included the power to prohibit it by way of licensing. Such authority to prohibit a right would not conform to or fulfill the purpose and meaning of “regulate.”

Regulate implies arranging in proper order and controlling a thing or condition which already exists and is not synonymous with prohibit. Yaworski v. Town of Canterbury, 154 A.2d 758, 760; 21 Conn. Sup. 347.

The power to regulate does not fairly mean the power to prohibit. Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165, 180.

Regulate, as ordinarily used, means to subject to rules or restrictions, to adjust by rule or method, to govern, and is not synonymous with prohibit. Simpkins v. State, P 168, 170; 35 Okla. Cr. 14

The power to license is the power to prohibit and does not conform to proper regulation of a Constitutional right. Licensing is an “extraordinary” measure, which cannot be used to regulate an “ordinary right,” like the right of travel, since it prohibits that right.

Even the legislature has no power to deny to a citizen the right to travel upon the highway and transport his property in the ordinary course of his business or pleasure, though this right may be regulated in accordance with the public interest and convenience. Chicago Coach Co. v. City of Chicago, 337 Ill. 200, 206.

Also, once a person has accepted a license, his rights become limited by the terms of the license or rules of the licensor. Any Constitutional rights that would normally stand above the rules under a license, now become limited by and subordinate to the terms and rules under the license statute or by the licensor:

The rights o a licensee can rise no higher than the terms of the statute or ordinance by which he became the holder. Steves v. Robie, 139 Me. 359, 363.

A license, such as a drivers license, allows the licensor to do things to or require things of the licensee that would otherwise be outside the power of the State, or a trespass upon his constitutional rights, such as blood and breath tests, mandatory seat belt use, etc., not to mention excluding him and his automobile from he public roads. This type of prohibitive power to exclude one from traveling on the public road by way of licensing, could only apply to those who had no inherent right to use the streets in the first place, such as a common carrier, as explained in Ex parte Dickey.

In Easton v Dowdy, 219 Ga. 555, the holding in the Georgia Supreme Court with said cite, that where someone wishes to use the public roads for business purposes, such as a “taxicab business,” the licensor can “grant or refuse a license in their discretion.” Also, the licensor can “prescribe such terms and conditions as it may see fit, and individuals desiring to avail themselves of such permission must comply with such terms and conditions, whether they are reasonable or unreasonable.” The same situation would hold true with a driver”s license. They thus are an unreasonable mode of regulating rights.

The police power of the States extends only to such measures as are reasonable, and the general rule is that all police regulations must be reasonable under all circumstances. Ex parte A.M. Smythe, 116 Tex. Crim. 146, 147; 28 S.W. 2d 161.

To transcend beyond the bounds of reasonable regulations of a constitutional right would constitute an invasion of that right. The reasonable regulation of a constitutional right, such as the right to freely travel on a public way, never included the power to prohibit it by licensing a person. Since “regulation is inconsistent with prohibition or exclusion” (Chicago Coach Co. v. City of Chicago, 337 Ill. 200, 206), licensing is inconsistent with proper regulation of a right. This lower court/tribunal apparently believes this Appellant is required to have a license, making the assumption that since the legislature has the authority to establish reasonable regulations for common travel, it also has the power to license it. This, of course, is a false assumption. The following holdings will correct this incorrect assumption at the heartland.

Does the power to regulate confer the right to license? We think not...We discover that to license and to regulate do not require the exercise of the same power, and the same objects are not attained by the acts authorized, and this being settled leads to the conclusion that the first cannot be exercised under authority to do the last. See The City of Burlington v. Bumgardner, 42 Iowa 673, 674.

The power to regulate does not necessarily include the power to license. In passing on the question of whether in a particular case the power to regulate includes the power to license, it is well to bear in mind the distinction between regulation and license. Regulations apply equally to all. A license, however, gives to the licensee a special privilege not accorded to others and which he himself otherwise would not enjoy. Once a power to license exists, certain acts becomes illegal for all who have not been licensed. Village of Brooklyn Center v. Rippen, 255 Minn. 334, 336-37; 96 N.W. 2d 585

The “act” of traveling in the several states or Connecticut has never been illegal. Nor is the nature of the act such that it can be illegal or regarded as a “special privilege.” it would be foolish and unconstitutional to say it is. Traveling in this country, regardless of what mode of conveyance used, has never been regarded as such because the power to license a citizen for exercising this right has never existed. This is because reasonable regulations of an inalienable right do not include compelling a citizen to waive his constitutional rights by submitting him to licensing, the very nature of which subjects the licensee to rules that can be unreasonable or a further trespass on his rights. In short, the exercise of an inalienable right cannot be made illegal by subjecting a person to a license. Legislative statute or fiat cannot change the nature of a constitutional right. The right or liberty to freely travel, which had existed when the Constitution of Connecticut was adopted, exists today, as the right is unchangeable:

2: Curtailment of unrestricted governmental activity within certain defined fields.

It becomes apparent that this court/tribunal is trying to change the purpose and intent of the Constitution of Connecticut. It is also apparent that this legislative tribunal (a de facto court) is trying to apply new and different legal principal to the exercise of constitutional rights that were originally beyond the power of “The State” to apply. The fact that an automobile is now being used to exercise this “unchangeable” inherent right to freely travel makes no difference in this case because, as previously shown, automobiles and pick-up vehicles have the “same right” (House v Cramer, supra) as those modes of travel used since the adoption of Connecticut’s Constitution. Thus, the same legal principles apply only to the automobile as with other modes of travel:

That the use of automobiles on the highways for business or recreation is unlawful, is no longer open to question. Such use involves only the application of a new appliance and mode of travel, rather than any new legal principle. Deputy v. Kimmell, 73 W. Va. 595, 597 (1914).

The California Constitution contains no grant of power to take away our right to use the road - and such a grant would violate the privileges and immunities clause.

Neither the state nor the Motor Vehicle Department can license the Defendant for traveling in an automobile any more than it could have licensed one traveling on foot or horse or carriage when the California Constitution was adopted.

It is obvious the intent of the Constitution was to preserve the inherent right and liberty of people to freely travel, and no absolute power to license people before they were allowed to exercise this basic right was ever imagined or considered. This intent of the Constitution exists to day and is applicable to the Appellant traveling in his automobile/pick-up vehicle.

The means which a constitutional provision had when adopted, it has today; its intent does not change with time nor with conditions; while it operates upon new subjects and change conditions, it operates with the same meaning and intent which it had when formulated and adopted. Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations (8th Ed.) Vol. 1, p. 123. As judge Cooley stated, to wit: AA constitution is not to be made to mean one thing at one time, and another at some subsequent time when the circumstances may have so changed as perhaps to make a different rule in the case seems desirable. Travelers’ Ins. C. v. Marshall, 76 S.W. (2d) 1007, 1011; 124 Texas 45.

This legislative court is bound to uphold the Constitution of Connecticut as it was written, which it reluctantly failed to do in its biased and distorted decision, one which was totally unsupported by fact or law. The Appellant can use an automobile/pick-up vehicle in his travel with the same freedom and legal right as that which was intended under the Constitution of Connecticut for a man to freely walk or ride his horse on the public road. The conditions may change but the meaning of the law does not. The trial court had all ignored and evaded the manner of constitutional law and rights in its decision. The court was apparently aware that if it had applied and upheld the rights and legal principles that were secured and fixed by Constitution, that it could never apply any driver’s licensing statutes to the Defendant for traveling in his automobile to date. Will this legislative court having heard the above avoid the arguments in this matter by twisting them out of context, and then stating that the Defendants arguments are not supported by case law or statute? While this has been shown to be totally false, it is strange that this legislative court has not stated that Constitutional law did not support the arguments presented! If such issues were of paramount importance why would this legislative court avoid this matter? This legislative court may find it necessary to hold the police power of this State as an absolute power over the Appellant’s Constitutional, inherent, and unalienable rights. This false position may have been necessary for them to take as being the only way such licensing legislation could be upheld and applied to the Defendant, not to mention giving the police a bear hug. The Appellant’s liberty and inherent right to freely travel are paramount over the police powers and cannot be superseded by licensing.

The powers of government, under our system, are nowhere absolute. They are but grants of authority from the people, and are limited to their true purpose. The fundamental rights of the people are inherent and have not been yielded to governmental control. They are not the subjects of government authority. They are the subjects of individual authority. Constitutional powers can never transcend constitutional rights. The police power is subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution upon every power of government; and it will not be suffered to invade or impair the fundamental liberties of the citizen, those natural rights which are the chief concern of the Constitution and for whose protection it was ordained by the people.* * * It [a constitutional right], is not a right, therefore, over which the police power is paramount. Like every other fundamental liberty, it is a right to which the police power is subordinate. Spann v. City of Dallas, 235 S.W. 513, 515; 111 Tex. 350 (1921). Goldman v. Crowther, 147 Md. 282, 306-07; 128 Atl. 50, 59 (1925).

Since the police power is “subordinate” to constitutional rights, the police power cannot possibly license (i.e. prohibit, make unlawful, or turn in to a privilege) the exercise of such a right, and thereby “transcend” such a right and put itself in a superior position. These rights are the most important part of the law of the land and such rights are beyond the reach of legislative interference. Thus the police power cannot constitutionally license these rights because to require a license by statute for the right to travel is to infer that the citizen has no inherent, vested or constitutional right to travel. This is the argument of the defendant from the very beginning of this case, and one that this legislative court has continually evaded and avoided. The driver’s license is an unwarranted interference with the Appellant’s fundamental right of travel in his automobile.

The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways* * *includes the right to drive a horse-drawn carriage or wagon thereon, or to operate an automobile thereon,* * *The rights aforesaid, being fundamental, are constitutional rights, and while the exercise thereof may be reasonably regulated by legislative act in pursuant of the police power of the State, and although those powers are broad, they do not rise above those privileges which are embedded in the constitutional structure. The police power cannot justify the enactment of any law which amounts to an arbitrary and unwarranted interference with, or unreasonable restriction on, those rights of the citizen which are fundamental. Teche Lines v. Danforth, 12 So. 2d 784, 787-88 (1943).

It is an undisputed fact that the courts/tribunals having created smoke screens by avoiding the above said subject matters, having nothing to do with the subject matters at hand, and has also tried to justify licensing by inferring it is imposed under the police power in the interest of public safety. Working with such unclean hands by administrators is unacceptable in what was designed by the founding fathers as “Honorable,” now brings a whole new meaning into Superior court/tribunal. This lower court/tribunal nonetheless yet to show how much licensing promotes public safety and welfare, and thus could not even justify or verify. This said court tribunal using the police power as a cover for its inept statements. The fact is that the police power cannot invade the area of inherent rights.

Where the ostensible object of an enactment is to secure the public comfort, welfare, or safety, it must appear to be adopted to that end. It cannot invade the rights of persons and property under the guise of a mere police regulation. City of Mt. Vernon v. Julian, 369 Ill. 447, 451 (1938).

But the police power, even as thus defined, vague and vast as it is, has its limitations, and it cannot justify and act which violates the prohibitions, expressed or implied, of the state or federal constitutions. If this were not so, and if the police power were superior to the constitution and if it extended to all objects which could be embraced within the meaning of the words “general welfare,” as defined by the lexicographers, the constitutions would be so much waste paper, because no right of the individual would be beyond its reach, and every property right and personal privilege and immunity of the citizen could be invaded at the will of the state, whenever in its judgment the convenience, prosperity, or mental or physical comfort of the public required it. Tighe v. Osborne, 149 Md. 349, 357; 181 A. 801, 803.

The argument that the driver’s license must be forced on each and every citizen for the sake of public safety, and thereby assuring only competent drivers are on the road, make a waste of paper of the Constitution by ignoring the fundamental rights involved. The administrators of the lower court/tribunal on public safety and welfare are actually in itself a false assumption. The first licensing law aimed at the private citizen in 1933, was required for a “person” to obtain a “driver’s license under this act, was to sign an application stating “that he is competent to operate a motor vehicle upon the public highways,” and pay 25 cents. Thus, the most illiterate and incompetent person could obtain a license. Anyone who had a visual, mental, or physical impairment could obtain a license, and anyone who was unfamiliar with the rules of the road or had never used an automobile could obtain a license. And indeed this did happen.

The driver’s license is a typical example of an abridgement of freedom by gradual and stealthy encroachments. The IRS is another example. When the Connecticut license law was passed on April 21, 1933 (just a short time after FDR declared the United States bankrupt on March 9, 1933), it did not go into effect for almost a year latter on March 1, 1934. So even though the law was placed on the books, it lay dormant for a year during which time nothing changed in the lives of citizens in traveling upon the roads thereby suppressing any immediate objections to it. And when it was enacted, history shows it was loosely enforced. The continued enforcement of the license is seen today to include everything from roadblocks to requiring mandatory seatbelts and insurance. Furthermore, the gradual evolution and adoption of “examinations” fourteen years after the license law was enacted was necessary because the people had to first be lulled into the idea that the State could license their right to travel. Where these “examinations” were required at the same time the ‘driver’s license” was required, along with its heavy and strict enforcement, mandatory seatbelt, mandatory insurance, etc., the people would then have seen it as an obvious and sudden usurpation of an inherent right and rebelled against it. Throughout our history we have been forewarned of such gradual encroachments upon our rights:

I believe there are more instances of the abridgment of freedom of the people by gradual and silent encroachment of those in power than by violent and sudden usurpations.----James Madison.

Illegitimate and constitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of persons and property should be liberally construed.* * *It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. Boyd v. United States (1886), 116 U.S. 616, 635; Ex parte Rhodes, 202 Ala. 68, 71.

The State has gradually convinced the citizenry that the exercise of their inalienable and constitutional right to liberty and to freely travel is an unlawful act, by gradually convincing them that a license is first required before the liberty and right to travel can be exercised. It thus would seem the primary purpose to which the driver’s license serves is that of legal control of a right, identification, and revenue, and not one of public safety.

Thus, the Defendant does and cannot constitutionally come under the purview of the “driver’s licensing” statute.

The nature of a driver’s license is such that it also infringes upon and prohibits the use of one’s property (i.e. automobile/pick-up vehicle). Appellant has never waived his rights, knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily to the use of his automobile via application of the driver’s license. The State of Connecticut driver’s license statute disallows a citizen to use his property (an automobile) and where he does use it, that property is taken away (towed and/or compounded). Such statutes cannot be held as being valid against an American and/or citizen.

Property in a thing consists not merely in its ownership and possession, but in the unrestricted right of use, enjoyment and disposal. Anything which destroys any of these elements of property, to that extent destroys the property itself. The substantial value of property lies in its use. If the right of use be denied, the value of the property is annihilated and ownership is rendered a barren right. Therefore a law which forbids the use of a certain kind of property, strips it of an essential attribute and in actual result proscribes its ownership.* * * Since the right of the citizen to use his property as he choose so long as he harms nobody, is an inherent and constitutional right, the police power cannot be invoked for the abridgment of a particular use of private property, unless such use reasonably endangers or threatens the public health, the public safety, the public comfort or welfare. Spann v. City of Dallas, 235 S. W. 513, 514-15.

So far as such use of one’s property may be had without injury to others it is a lawful use which cannot be absolutely prohibited by the legislative department under the guise of the exercise. In re Kelso, 147 Cal. 609, 612 (1905).

To date, this legislative court/tribunal acting with an administrator designated from de facto Legislation (rule makers for the corporate State), under bankruptcy supplies no evidence that the Defendant has caused any injury or property damage in the use of his property traveling upon the public roads. The “driver’s license” can and would allow the Defendant’s property to be abridged by forbidding him to use that property until he becomes licensed.

An automobile is not dangerous per se. Thus, rule and legal principles (such as a license prohibiting its use), which are applicable to those things required “extraordinary care in the use and control,” are not applicable to automobiles/pick-up vehicles. This court/tribunal has given no justification for prohibiting the Defendant the use of his property.

The ill-trained Gestapo police here are mistaken about the law. They and the courts here are both short-sighted with regard to the right to use the roads.

2. Common Tenancy of the public road. No license is required for a tenant in common to use the common property.

3. Legislature has no right to dissolve our tenancy. Traveling on the roads in California (except the toll roads) has always been free to all. The legislature has no authority to take away that right.

C. The driver’s license creates a distinction in rights of citizens using the public roads for travel. All citizens are to have equal rights in the use of the roads for ordinary travel and none are to have superior rights (i.e. bicyclists) over another (i.e. automobilists/pick-up vehicles). The driver’s license imposes a burden and restriction on Americans and/or citizens traveling by automobiles/pick-up vehicles that does not exist on other travelers. D. The driver’s license confers a statutory right, that being the right to travel on the public roads with an automobile/pick-up vehicle, which the Appellant already possess an inalienable, constitutional and vested right. Thus the driver’s license is nugatory and meaningless against the Appellant.

The driver’s license gives to the licensor the power to prohibit and preclude the Defendant’s right to use the public roads for travel. This is an extraordinary measure that could only be used on this engaged in commercial travel.

The driver’s license makes the Defendant’s constitutional liberty and right of locomotion subordinate to the police powers. However, the police power can never transcend constitutional rights but rather is always subordinate to them since these rights are part of the supreme law of this State.

Other constitutional rights of the Defendant are subject to be limited or forced to be waived by any terms or rules under such licensing. This would constitute an “unreasonable” exercise of police powers.

The driver’s license, where applied to the Defendant, would require him to surrender and transfer his inalienable right of liberty and locomotion to this State in lieu of the license (i.e. statutory privilege) which is constitutionally impossible.

A word about administrative law and statutes. In California, the meaning of statutes has been diluted. Subject matter which might better be relegated to regulations and been elevated to the status of statute. “While in practical effect regulations may be called “little laws” they are at most but off-spring of statutes.” See United States v. Jones, 345 U.S. 377, 73 S.Ct. 759, 97 L ED.. 1108. The result is that neither the statute nor the regulations are complete without the other, and only to together do they have any force. In effect, therefore, the construction of one necessarily involves the construction of the other. See U.S. v. Mersky, 361 U.S. 431, 80 S.Ct. 459

These powers are utilized in the Superior courts throughout California and nearly all the states, not just as a resource for income (taking of property from the people traveling in Connecticut, but also in the same way the Jews in Nazi Germany were identified with a tattoo on the arm for control.

The claim and exercise of a Constitutional right cannot be converted into a crime.@ Miller v U.S., 230 F.2d 488, 489. Murdock v Pennsylvania (1943) 319 U.S. 105, 63 S.Ct. 870, 87 Lawyers Edition ___, __ __

Signed, William Hoster: ___________________ Date: _______________________________

I, Douglas Palaschak, declare the following under penalty of perjury. I served this Document #5597 upon the persons listed in the service list by 1st class postage prepaid on this ___ day of ___, 2004.