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Judge Arthur Grim, Presiding, Civil side. Mary Ann R Sutton, Prothonotary 610 478 6970

Notice of Application for Writ of Prohibition and Application for Order to Show Cause

To all respondents: At the venue designated in the caption or at such other venue as shall be deemed appropriate I will ask the court to stop you from interfering with my right to use the road.

"Complete freedom of the highways is so old and well established a blessing that we have forgotten the days of the Robber Barons and toll roads, and yet, under an act like this, arbitrarily administered, the highways may be completely monopolized, if, through lack of interest, the people submit, then they may look to see the most sacred of their liberties taken from them one by one, by more or less rapid encroachment." -Robertson vs. Department of Public Works, 180 Wash 133,147

"Personal liberty largely consists of the Right of locomotion -- to go where and when one pleases -- only so far restrained as the Rights of others may make it necessary for the welfare of all other citizens. The Right of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, by horsedrawn carriage, wagon, or automobile, is not a mere privilege which may be permitted or prohibited at will, but the common Right which he has under his Right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Under this Constitutional guarantee one may, therefore, under normal conditions, travel at his inclination along the public highways or in public places, and while conducting himself in an orderly and decent manner, neither interfering with nor disturbing another's Rights, he will be protected, not only in his person, but in his safe conduct." [emphasis added] American Jurisprudence 1st. Constitutional Law, Sect.329, p 1135.

Dombrowski Petition to enjoin prosecution of William Hoster and to Enjoin police employee from contacting Hoster regarding his licensure.

Application for Order to Show Cause why Pennsylvania should not be enjoined from prosecuting William Hoster regarding his right to drive.

Now I operate my farm suffering the hardship of being deprived of being able to drive my pickup.

The Nature of a License: permission to do something that one otherwise may not do.

The Department of Motor Vehicles has by stealthy encroachment overstepped its bounds

Some cases that flesh out the difference between “rights” and “privileges”

Liberties may not be licensed - although by stealthy encroachment that was the trend

Some would say that the right to travel is limited to travel without a car. They are wrong.

The California Constitution contains no grant of power to take away our right to use the road - and such a grant would violate the privileges and immunities clause.

Gibbons v. Ogden (Feb 1824) 22 US 1, 6 L Ed 23, 9 Wheat 1. Steamboat licensing dispute. 1

Murdock v. Pennsylvania (1943) www.lawyerdude.8k.com/murdock.html 1 319 U.S. 105 2

U.S. v Mersky (1960) 361 U.S. 431: An administrative regulation, of course, is not a "statute." 1

Escobedo v. State Dept. of Motor Vehicles (1950), 222 Pac. 2d 1, 5, 35 Cal.2d 870 (1950). The losing side made all the correct arguments in this case. correct argument 1

Chicago Motor Coach v. Chicago, 169 NE 221. “The use of the highway for the purpose of travel and transportation is not a mere privilege, but a common fundamental right of which the public and individuals cannot rightfully be deprived." 1

Robertson vs. Department of Public Works, 180 Wash 133,147 "Complete freedom of the highways is so old and well established a blessing that we have forgotten the days of the Robber Barons and toll roads, and yet, under an act like this, arbitrarily administered, the highways may be completely monopolized, if, through lack of interest, the people submit, then they may look to see the most sacred of their liberties taken from them one by one, by more or less rapid encroachment.".

U.S. Constitution: Art. 1 Section 10, Clause 3: “ No state shall, without Consent of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State. . .” 1

American Jurisprudence, 1st Edition. Constitutional Law, Sect.329, p.1135 “The Right of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, by horsedrawn carriage, wagon, or automobile, is not a mere privilege which may be permitted or prohibited at will, but the common Right which he has under his Right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Under this Constitutional guarantee one may, therefore, under normal conditions, travel at his inclination along the public highways or in public places, and while conducting himself in an orderly and decent manner, neither interfering with nor disturbing another's Rights, he will be protected, not only in his person, but in his safe conduct."

Dombrowski Petition to enjoin prosecution of William Hoster and to Enjoin police employee from contacting Hoster regarding his licensure.

Application for Order to Show Cause why Pennsylvania should not be enjoined from prosecuting William Hoster regarding his right to drive.

Petitioner William Hoster asks this court to issue an Order to Show Cause why Respondents should not should not be enjoined from prosecuting William Hoster regarding his right to drive.

I am 71 years old. I was raised by Mennonites. I speak Pennsylvania Dutch. I operate a farm. I live alone. I am severely hardshipped by being treated like a child. I speak Pennsylvania Dutch. I have lived on this farm for 30 years. I am severely hardshipped by being treated like a child. I am a 71 year old farmer in terror of driving my own truck down roads built with my tax money for the past half century. On 29 September 2001 I exercised my right to use the roads. I drove my old Ford pickup truck. On my way home I noticed that a police car followed me for 3.5 miles.

At 1:45 pm Corporal Elser made a pretextual and illegal traffic stop. He lied telling me that my tail lights were out, but I drove directly to a gas station and the lights all worked perfect there.

I knew this Corporal Elser from previous unpleasant experiences with him. I notice that another officer stood at the right door with his hand on his gun as though he were arresting Bonny and Clyde.

Notice that he gave me no ticket for bad lights. Then Elser said to me “I know where you live”.

The information should have been suppressed for violation of the 4th amendment, but the court denied me my right to counsel. I am a 71 year old farmer in terror of driving my own truck down roads built with my tax money for the past half century.

I suffered a fake trial there being no court reporter. This was in a “district court”

On November 13th, 2001 the 8th day after trial, I attempted to file a notice of appeal. I contend that this notice of appeal was by law satisfactory and therefore constituted adequate notice of appeal.

To be sure of following the procedure, I asked David Connolly to file a redundant notice of appeal.

My legal adviser, David Connolly, express mailed my notice of appeal so that it would arrive in time.

The serial number on the Express Mail package was EF 198367148. Express Mail is guaranteed to arrive on the next day.

My redundant notice of appeal arrived on the 16th day, one day late. Nonetheless I had already filed a notice of appeal. The law respects substance more than form.

I have been afraid to drive my truck since that encounter with the angry policeman and the oppressive court which denied my right to appeal - and also committed a host of other violations of my civil rights. I consider the trial a legal nullity.

Now I operate my farm suffering the hardship of being deprived of being able to drive my pickup.

Farmers are sui generis - a class of their own. Farmers learn to drive at age 11. I have driven horses. I have driven all manner of farm machinery. Of all these devices, the automobile and pickup truck are the easiest. I have been driving cars and trucks since 1943 when I was 11 years old. And now some man with a badge is doing a public service by insisting that I obtain permission from the state to drive on the road. This makes no sense.

Turns out that I am not the only one who feels the oppression on farm folks. Here is what my lawyer says: At first they wanted the Amish to pay social security taxes. Then Congress intervened to avoid a conflict. Then they wanted to Amish to make their kids go to school until the 12th grade. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Amish in Wisconsin v Yoder . The driver license is even more oppressive than the license that the court declared unconstitutional in Murdock v. Pennsylvania (1943):

Constitutional law is the study of competing societal goals. No societal goal is offended if we find a law inapplicable to farmers; we have a unique lifestyle. We are more and more a discrete and insular minority. We have our own unarticulated social norms. Law necessary in the city (where kids don’t learn to drive as early or as well) are not necessary in the country. When you have an angry city cop trying to impose his will on farm folks, well that just aint right.

I ask this court to order the police to leave me alone and let me operate my farm in peace as I have for the past 40 years.

The townships generally required citizens to contribute approximately 10 days in the spring to fix the roads. Those citizens with wagons hauled macadam rock and other materials.

The implied contract was this: “Help us build roads and the benefit will flow to us and to our children and to our children’s children”. That was a social contract. The police now by stealthy encroachment have made it to appear that the roads were not built according to social contract. The police not make it appear that they own the roads. They attempt to force us to buy a ticket to use the roads. They patrol the road in front of my house like knights of the king’s road. I am 71 years old. I ask the court to make the necessary orders to permit me to drive my pickup on the roads that I helped build by paying land taxes for a half century.

Evolution of Driver License - as related by Charles Sprinkle of Ojai, California

Charles was born in 1939 in West Virginia. He says that volunteers patrolled the roads carrying gasoline for people with car problems. Eventually every driver paid 25 cents toward the gasoline fund. The receipt for this 25 cents was your license to use the road and partake of the services should you become stranded.

I, Douglas Palaschak, declare the following under penalty of perjury: I remember. I was raised on a grand corn and soybean farm in Illinois. When I was age 9, each of my Grandfathers owned a grain truck. Both trucks said the same thing on the side: “Not for hire”. I pondered this strange message for many years. Why would you not hire your truck out? Why make an issue of it before anybody even asks? The answer seemed to be that if you hired out your truck then you became subject to a higher tax on the truck. In fact to this day there is a rule, perhaps unwritten, that a farmer may drive his truck to the nearest grain elevator just as he may drive his tractor and wagon, to wit: without regard for licenses on the driver or the truck - because none are needed for the tractor and wagon hauling corn in from the field.

I drove a grain truck again on the farm in the harvests of 1996, 1997, and 1998. I drove it without a driver license for a truck, and, as I recall, the trucks, or at least one of them was not currently registered. That is how the issue arose.

By stealthy encroachment the state takes away our liberty and sells is back to us as a license. The stealth encroachment process of the corporation/ state against the human depends on time for its success. The human lives perhaps 85 years. The corporation/ state has eternal life. As each succeeding generation dies off, the next generation fails to remember the lessons and history of the previous generation. The corporation state counts on that. Defendant remembers the way it was.

Stealthy encroachment at work: The state counts on this generation to forget that we use the roads as tenants in common - not as licensees! Teodor Marian and his Mentor Richard McDonald have researched this vein. By looking back at old disputes regarding roads, rivers, and other ways of passage, we see clearly that the view was that public property is nothing more than property held in common tenancy for use by the public.

The licensee must request the license from the licensor, he cannot demand it from him. The licensor cannot require the licensee to take his license under the licensee has encroached upon the thing or act that the licensor has competent authority over. You cannot demand a liquor license. By comparison you can use the road without even demanding anything. It is there to be used by all.

The Nature of a License: permission to do something that one otherwise may not do.

You may not hunt pheasant in my corn field without my permission. However, we each have the right, barring abuse, to use the road. We are tenants on common on the road.

To license means to confer on a person the right to do something which otherwise he would not have the right to do. City of Louisville v Sebree (19__) 214 SW 2nd 248, 308 Ky 420

The object of a license is to confer a right or power, which does not exist without it. Payne v. Massey (19__) 196 SW 2nd 493, 145 Tex 273.

The word “license” means permission, or authority; and a license to do any particular thing, is a permission or authority to do that thing; and if granted by a person having power to grant it, transfers to the grantee the right to do whatever it purports to authorize. Gibbons v. Ogden (Feb 1824) 22 US 1, 6 L Ed 23, 9 Wheat 1.

A good place to start is Edwards v California (1941) 314 U.S. 160. The court held that a state may not condition interstate travel upon wealth Footnote . (That yellow cartoon word bubble is a footnote. Click on it and the footnote will pop up.) I contend that the driver license scheme is merely a regressive tax and therefore an impermissible barrier to interstate commerce. People are commerce. Interstate commerce includes, ironically, instate commerce, for purpose of this analysis.

The Department of Motor Vehicles has by stealthy encroachment overstepped its bounds

There is a case that says that all administrative law is unconstitutional. We need not be that drastic. Certainly there are some things that the Department of Motor Vehicles can do lawfully. They can assist in transferring title of a car. They can administer a driver test. Even if the state legislature cooperates and passes a “statute” for the motor vehicle code, that “statute” is really more like a “regulation” in that even the legislature has no power to impede commerce absent compelling state interest.

The culprit here is stealthy encroachment; the state has attempted to change the meaning of words. Read “Public Licenses and Private Rights (1953) Excerpts from 33 Oregon Law Review 1 (Barnett, 1953) This article becomes even stronger if you add the due process progress in the past half century. This page is www.lawyerdude.8k.com/5943.html

The so-called driver license is not a license but 2 other things: It is a receipt for payment of the road tax - which was a subject of discussion by Henry David Thoreau. It is also a proof of driving competency. Today it is also an internal passport.

The driving license laws are all overbroad and they all deny equal protection. The state has carved out a plethora of examples. They need to merely recognize some exception for Farmer Hoster. They recognize an exception for soldiers and postal carriers even though no such exception is written in the statute. As to farmers there is custom and tradition; that is what Hoster relies on, but getting back to overbreadth, the postal case is from 1920. Johnson v Maryland http://www.lawyerdude.8m.com/5089.html 254 U.S. 51 (1920) The courts will gladly recognize the importance of postal workers, military, and out of state drivers and consular folks, but it sees its own people as serfs, as a cash sow. This is fundamentally wrong. There is a lot to say about this concept of discrimination by a state against its own people. We are NOT subjects of the state. This, I think, is what Charlie Sprinkle thinks. I agree with him. The man fought for our country in a war where he could have been killed, an now they tell him that he cannot drive here without their permission - but the Korean folks who were on the other side can come here and drive without a California license. This is the old case that says that postal workers don’t need no stinking driver license - but now the state wants to make sure that farmer William Hoster has one even though he is 68 years old and never had a driver license and has driven tractors, trucks, combines, cars, and, uh, horses all his life.

Conclusion. Most laws of general application are not laws of general application. there is the overlord group and the sheeple. This is the grist of Overbreadth. There is almost always an overbreadth case to be made regarding a traffic ticket.

The state sees itself as the king of us. They don't want to fight the government. The law has never been well argued for the folks who have no license. License is permission to do something that you would not have a right to do otherwise. You buy license to sell a patented object. Then, recently in history, the states reached critical mass and decided to become feudal kingdoms and profit centers. This postal case is published on the net at www.lawyerdude.8m.com/5274.html

The Supreme Court said in U.S. v Mersky (1960) 361 U.S. 431: An administrative regulation, of course, is not a "statute." While in practical effect regulations may be called "little laws," 1. 7 they are at most but offspring of statutes.” I cite this case only to point out that indeed there is a difference between regulations and statutes. Furthermore, not all laws are created equal. Furthermore, a statute that regulates without constitutional authority is a nullity even though it be published in the books, recognized by the police and lowers courts, and even though it be unchallenged for decades. Such is current state of driver license laws in these United States. We are in the age of government excess. Over half the working people work for some form of government. By manipulating the money, by imprisoning dissenters, by owning the bulk of the stock of public corporations, by deceptive bookkeeping, and by other oppression, fraud, and malice, the governments have lulled the populace into a belief in the presumed regularity of whatever the government says. Well, I am here to tell you it aint so!

"The right of the citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, either by carriage or by automobile, is not a mere privilege which a city may prohibit or permit at will, but a common law right which he has under the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Thompson v. Smith, 154 SE 579.

"The use of the highway for the purpose of travel and transportation is not a mere privilege, but a common fundamental right of which the public and individuals cannot rightfully be deprived." Chicago Motor Coach v. Chicago, 169 NE 221.

"Complete freedom of the highways is so old and well established a blessing that we have forgotten the days of the Robber Barons and toll roads, and yet, under an act like this, arbitrarily administered, the highways may be completely monopolized, if, through lack of interest, the people submit, then they may look to see the most sacred of their liberties taken from them one by one, by more or less rapid encroachment." Robertson vs. Department of Public Works, 180 Wash 133,147.

"Personal liberty largely consists of the Right of locomotion -- to go where and when one pleases -- only so far restrained as the Rights of others may make it necessary for the welfare of all other citizens. The Right of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, by horsedrawn carriage, wagon, or automobile, is not a mere privilege which may be permitted or prohibited at will, but the common Right which he has under his Right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Under this Constitutional guarantee one may, therefore, under normal conditions, travel at his inclination along the public highways or in public places, and while conducting himself in an orderly and decent manner, neither interfering with nor disturbing another's Rights, he will be protected, not only in his person, but in his safe conduct.” American Jurisprudence 1st Edition, Constitutional Law, Sect.329, p.1135.

Consider the compact by which all states seem to want you to have a driver license from one state only.

U.S. Constitution: Art. 1 Section 10, Clause 3: “ No state shall, without Consent of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State. . .”

Some cases that flesh out the difference between “rights” and “privileges”

The permission or license is a special right or privilege. Once a license exists only the licensee has he right to do the thing the licensor allows. The licensee is privileged over others who do not have a license. It thus is a privilege to have the right to do the thing that is licensed. In other words, the right or permission granted by the licensor is a privilege since he controls who can and who cannot exercise the right. If the licensor grants the licensee a right or benefit, it is called a privilege:

The word privilege is defined as a peculiar benefit, favor, or advantage, a right or immunity not enjoyed by all, or it may be enjoyed only under special conditions. Knoll Golf Club v U.S., 179 F Supp 377

Since the right or permission to do a thing is called a license, and since the right is “peculiar” to the licensee alone, the license is called a privilege. Anything that requires a license is a privilege.

A license for the sale of intoxicating liquor is a privilege. Chiordi v Jernigan 129 P 2nd 640, 642; 46 NM 396.

Even privileges must be administered even-handedly. Authority: Equal Protection Clause.

Also, grandfather clauses, and implied clauses, forbid the state to take away a vested right.

Those have the right to do something cannot be licensed for what they already have right to do as such license would be meaningless. City of Chicago v Collins (19__) 51 NE 907, 910.

Also, those things which are considered as inalienable rights, which all Americans possess, cannot be licensed since those are not held to be a privilege.

The right to freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and freedom of religious worship are not privileges. Douglas v City of Jeannette 130 F 2nd 652, 655.

A license bypasses a legal barrier or makes an otherwise unlawful act lawful. The nature of a license allows the licensee to do something he could not otherwise legally do. Thus, a license gives the licensee the right to do something that would otherwise be illegal or unlawful for him to do.

A license is a mere permit to do something that without it would be unlawful. Littleton v Burgess, 82 P 864, 866, 14 Wyo 173.

A license is a right granted by some competent authority to do an act which, without such license, would be illegal. Beard v City of Atlanta (__) 86 SE 2nd 672, 676; 91 Ga. App. 584.

A licensee is one privileged to enter or remain on land by virtue of the possessor’s consent, whether given by invitation or permission. Wool v Larner, 26 A 2nd 89, 92, 112 Vt. 431.

The licensor has the power to prohibit. Since the licensor is in the position to grant a right or permission it logically follows that he has the power to prohibit the act also. Likewise, having the power to prohibit something from being done, it follows as a corollary that power also exists to permit its use. Taylor v Smith, 140 Va. 217, 235. Thus, where the power to license exists so does he power to prohibit.

The authority to license implies the power to prohibit, such being the meaning of the term. The City of Burllington v. Bumgardner, 42 Iowa 673, 674.

The power to license necessarily includes the power to inhibit unlicensed persons from doing the acts authorized by license. The power to refuse license necessarily gives the power to limit the issuance of licenses. Ex parte M.T. Dickey, 76 W. Va.576, 585; 85 SE 781.

A license means leave to do a thing which the licensor could prevent. Blatz Brewing Co. v. Collins, 160 P.2d 37, 39; 69 Cal. A. 2d 639.

Since the Motor Vehicles Departments, i.e., licensors, the Motor Vehicles Department(s) can issue or refuse to issue a license and thereby permit or prohibit anyone from exercising the right or privilege they has authority over.

A license carries limitations, restrictions and requirements. Whenever a license is issued the licensee is under certain limitations and requirements established by the Motor Vehicles Department (licensor), which may be implied or expressed when the license was issued. These limitations and requirements are often in the form of rules and regulations and may be referred to as the “terms” of the license, which the licensee is subject to. The following decision reveals these characteristics:

“Licensee,” as used in Pub. St. c. 100, in reference to certain licensees, and providing that no such licensee shall place or maintain any screen, curtain, or other obstruction on the licensed premises, refers to every licensee, and not merely such as have been required by the licensing board to remove a screen, curtain, or other obstruction. Commonwealth v. Rourke, 6 N.E. 383, 384; 141Mass. 321.

Those that are licensed under the statute cited above are restricted in their ability to erect curtains, screens, or other obstructions on their premises due to the terms of the license. It matters not where these terms were directly stated to the licensee or stated in the rules and regulations that cover such licensed businesses, the licensee still becomes subject to the terms of the license. There can be no argument that such terms are unreasonable as the licensor is in authority to make any such rules.

If a city chooses to grant permission [a license] to individuals to conduct a taxicab business in its streets, it can prescribe such terms and conditions as it may see fit, and individuals desiring to avail themselves of such terms and conditions, whether they are reasonable or unreasonable. Eason v. Dowdy, 219 Ga. 555.

Also, any argument that such terms are in violation of one’s rights has no legal standing. When person(s) takes a license, he in effect must waive any rights that would otherwise conflict with the terms of the license. The licensor has the authority over the thing being licensed therefore his term must prevail over the rights of the licensee and out of respect of the licensor’s right to control the thing or act. Thus, the rights of the licensee are limited by the terms of the license.

The rights of a licensee can rise no higher than the terms of the statute or ordinance by which he became the holder. Steves et al. v Robie, 139 Me. 359, 363.

The licensee must submit to the rules, limitations, and requirements the licensor sets out as the terms of the license.

A license is revocable by the licensor. When a license exists, it is within the power of the Motor Vehicles Department(s) (licensor) to revoke the license at any time this entity wishes.

Permits to carry on a liquor business issued under Liquor Control Act are mere licenses revocable as provided in such act. State v. Hawlew, 44 N.E. 2d 815, 820.

A license, pure and simple, is a mere personal privilege, and it is revocable at law, at the pleasure of the licensor, even when money has been paid for it. River Development Corp. v. Liberty Corp., 133 A. 2d 373, 385; 45 N.J. Super. 445.

A license is one to whom an owner of realty has granted a mere right of occupancy, and such license is revocable at the option of the licensor. Caldwell v. Mitchell, 158 NYS 2d 868, 870.

The licensee cannot possibly revoke the license he is the holder of since he did not give himself the permission or license in the first place. Only the licensor can revoke a license.

The terms and rules of a license are amendable. Restrictions, limitations, and requirements can be added, deleting or modified at a future date and become new terms of the license. Here again only the licensor is able to amend the terms and conditions of the license. Thus, when the licensor makes a requirement after the license is issued, the licensee is subject to that requirement just as though it were an original condition of the license.

The foregoing characteristics of a license reveal the legal principles that potentially exist whenever licensing takes place.

A license is often found under the law of contracts and apparently shares some attributes of contract. However, in its truest sense, a license is not a contract and it has generally been so held.

A license is merely a privilege to do business and is not a contract between authority granting it and grantee nor is it a property right, nor does it create a vested right. Mayo v. Market Fruit Co. of Sanford, Fla.,40 So. 2d 555, 559.

A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal granting it and the person to whom it is granted, and is not property or a property right. American States Water Services Co. of California v Johnson, 88 P.2d 770, 774; 31 Cal. App. 2d 606.

A license requires that one of the parties have competent authority over the thing or the act involved in the agreement whereas a contract does not. A license can be terminated by one of the parties at any time but a contract cannot. These authorities also show that a license is not property right because it is not in itself property. Neither is a license a vested right but only a privilege.

The Undersigned now brings to light in what manner can a license be used when controlling the acts of individuals that are regarded as “natural rights,” or in exercising [3] “constitutional rights.”

Liberties may not be licensed - although by stealthy encroachment that was the trend

The terms liberty and license are often viewed as two different things. Liberty being a sacred right everyone has, and a license being a grant that is often assigned and documented by way of a piece of paper. This is true where we use these words as if they are commonly understood.

Liberty is viewed as an inherent and inalienable right, and one all free men naturally possess. This is to be distinguished from the type of right given by an individual or government, which is commonly called a license. Thus, the latter is not, and cannot be, considered as a substitute for the former.

However, the technical and legal definition of these two words is actually synonymous.

Definition: “License”: Leave; permission; authority or liberty given to do or forbear any act. A license may be verbal or written; when written, the paper containing the authority is called a license. A man is not permitted to retail spirituous liquors till he has obtained a license. Webster’s American Dictionary, 1828.

It can be seen by this definition that a license is a liberty. Once one has a “license” one has “liberty” or is at liberty to do something.

The basis of the RIGHT TO TRAVEL primarily centers around the peoples inalienable and natural right of “liberty.” At times, both “The State” and the U.S. Constitution recognize liberty.

Personal liberty, which is guaranteed to every citizen under our Constitution and laws, consists of the right of locomotion - to go where one pleases, and when, and to do what may lead to one’s business or pleasure, only so far restrained as the rights of others may make necessary for the welfare of all other citizens.

One may travel along the public highways or in public places. *** These are rights which existed long before our [their Federal] Constitution, and we have taken just pride in their maintenance, making them a part of the fundamental law of the land. Pinkerton v. Verberg, 78 Mi ch. 573, 584, 44 N.W. 579 (1889).

There now exists policies/laws that attempt to prohibit travel in the several states that attempt to prohibit travel by way of “driver’s licenses” and taxes, along with other quasi-State laws.

The two rights of liberty and property which are taken for granted, are extremely important rights and when claimed and asserted should not be taken lightly by the courts.

This court has consistently held to the view that liberty of the person and the right to the control of one’s own property are very sacred rights which should not be taken away or withheld except for very urgent reasons. In re Guardianship of Collition, 164 N.W. 2d 480, 483; 41Wis. 2d 487 (1969).

Since the Governors Convention on March 6, 1933 and the bankruptcy of this Nation by the infamous Franklin D. Roosevelt on March 9, 1933, the States have come increasingly more and more aggressive in controlling the people and their property, and these States will now not tolerate anyone traveling in their domain without their permission, i.e. license. Just a short time after this bankruptcy, on April 21, 1933, the license law was passed, but not enforced....?

When government passes an unlawful act, such as the licensing of a right, people need to know they have no obligation to obey it, for it is void from the time it was enacted:

An unconstitutional legislative enactment, through law in form, is in fact not law at all. It confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it is in legal contemplation as inoperative as though it had never been passed. Bonnett v. Vallier, 116 N.W. 885, 136 Wis. 193 (1908); Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442.

Where the people remain ignorant of the law, they will be in bondage. Quoting Thomas Jefferson: “If a people expects to be ignorant and free, they expect what never was and never will be.”

The following maxim was often cited in early America to guard against this problem:

That no free government, or the blessings of liberty, can be preserved to any people but by a firm adherence to justice and virtue, and by a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles. See, Bonnett v. Vallier, 116 N.W. 885, 136 Wis. 193 (1908); Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442.

Defendant claims all God given Natural Rights and asserts these inherited rights that are unalienable reinforced in “The Declaration of Independence” (1776), where the defendant does not descend from, here, now, and in the future, knowingly or unknowingly.

The acting members/officers doing business in this instant matter have taken an “Oath of Office,” an alliance, The Constitution for the United States of America, Preamble (1787). Thus, it is these instruments (along with social and moral obligations) that are first and foremost duty to uphold. Therefore the Defendant will hold these representatives/officers/employees/trustees to their Oaths and/or alliances].

One of the rights involved in this matter is liberty, the liberty belonging to Defendant, which are fundamental and inalienable rights. They cannot be destroyed or diminished by legislative acts, or failure to act.

Those acting in government cannot override constitutional law, i.e. The Bill of Rights, at defiance by lightly passing over the peoples rights to liberty which is so deeply imbedded in God given Rights and your constitutions.

The right of liberty encapsulates the right of locomotion or travel is basic and obvious. The establishment and understanding of this liberty, as it applies to the defendant, is of paramount importance in making a decision in this matter. The “Liberty” claimed here includes the Aright to travel.” This “Right to Travel,” however, is not created by the Constitution but rather by the Union, which your alliance to the Constitution protects.

The first issue that must be established is what is the nature of a public road or highway, and what are the rights of the defendant thereon. All of your authorities agree that the use of roadways for ordinary travel is a basic and fundamental right:

A highway is a way over which the public have a free right of passage. Yale University v. City of New Haven, 104 Conn. 610; 134 Atl. 268, 271.

The essential features of a highway is that it is a way over which the public at large has he right to pass. State v. Pierson, 2 Conn. Cir. 660; 204 A.2d 838.

This right pf the people is in the street and highways of the state, whether inside or outside the municipalities thereof, is a paramount right. Light & Coke v. City of Chicago, N.E.2d 777, 781; 413 Ill. 457 (1952).

It is well settled that the public are entitled to a free passage along the highway. Michelson v. Dwyer, 63 N.W.2d 513, 517; 158 Neb. 427 (1954).

Our society is built in part upon free passage of men and goods, and the public streets and highways may rightfully be used for travel by everyone. Hanson v. Hall, 202 Minn. 381, 383.

Public ways, as applied to ways by land, are usually termed “highways” or “public roads,” are such ways as every citizen has a right to use. Kripp v. Curtis, 11 P. 879; 71 Cal. 62

A highway includes all public ways which the public generally has a right to use for passage and traffic, and includes streets in cities, sidewalks, turnpikes and bridges. Central Ill. Coal Mining Co. v. Illinois Power Co., 249 Ill. App.199.

Our courts has stressed he basic right of the transient public and abutting property owners to the free passage of vehicles on public highways and the paramount function of travel as overriding all other subordinate uses of our streets. State v. Perry, 269 Minn. 204, 206

A highway is a public road, which every citizen of the state has a right to use for the purpose of travel. Shelby County Com’rs v. Castetter, 33 N.E. 986, 987, 7 Ind. App. 309; Spindler v. Toomey, 111 N.E. 2nd 715, 716 (Ind.-1963).

The public have a right of free and unobstructed transit over streets, sidewalks and alleys, and this is the primary appropriate use to which they are generally dedicated. Pugh v. City, 176 Iowa 593, 599, 156 N.W. 892, 894.

It is well settled law that every member of the public has a right to use the public roads in a reasonable manner for the promotion of his health and happiness. Sumner v. County v. Interurban Transp. Co., 141 Tenn. 493 500.

A highway is a road or way upon which all persons have a right to travel at pleasure. It is the right of all persons to travel upon a road. Gulf & S.I.R. Co. v Adkinson, 77 So. 954, 955; 117 Miss. 118.

HIGHWAY.-A free and public road, way, or street; one which every person has the right to use. Black’s Law Dictionary, 2d Ed. (1910), p. 571

The right to travel over a street or highway is a primary absolute right of everyone. Foster’s Inc. v. Boise City, 118 P.2d 721, 728

A right is a passage, road or street which every citizen has a right to use. Ohio, Indiana, & W. Ry. Co. v. People, 39 Ill. App. 473.

Highways are public roads, which every citizen has a right to use. Wild v. Deig, 43 Ind. 455, 458; 13 Am. Rep. 399.

The courts of this land have repeatedly and consistently concurred on the fact that the people have a right to travel on the public roads and highways of this country. But the nature of this right must be determined. What type of right is it questioned here? It is only a statutory right or an inherent right? The cases cited indicate that it is a fundamental, inalienable, inherent and constitutional right. Other authorities verify this to be true:

It is settled that the streets of a city belong to the people of a state and the use thereof is an inalienable right of every citizen of the state. Whyte v. City of Sacramento, 65 Cal. App. 534, 547, 224 Pac. 1008, 1013 (1924); Escobedo v. State Dept. of Motor Vehicles (1950), 222 Pac. 2d 1, 5, 35 Cal.2d 870 (1950).

The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon in the ordinary course of life and business is a common right which he has under his right to enjoy life and liberty, to acquire and possess property, and to pursue happiness and safety. Thompson v. Smith, 154 S.E. 579, 583 (Va.-1930).

This right of the people to the use of the public streets of a city is so well established and so universally recognized in this country, that it has become a part of the alphabet of fundamental rights of the citizen. Swift v. City of Topeka, 23 Pac. 1075,1076, 43 Kansas 671, 674.

The right of a citizen to use the highways, include the streets of the city or town, for travel and to transport his goods, is an inherent right which cannot be taken from him. Florida Motor Lines v. Ward, 137 So. 163, 167. Also: State v. Quigg, 114 So. 859, 862 (Fla.-1927); Davis v. City of Houston, 264 S.W. 625, 629 (Tex. Civ. App., 1924).

The right to travel, to go from place to place as the means of transportation permit, is a natural right subject to the rights of others and to reasonable regulation under law. Shactman v Dulles, 225 F.2d 938, 941 (1955)

The right of the citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon either by carriage or by automobile, is not a mere privilege which a city may prohibit or permit at will, but, a common right.@ See Thompson v Smith, 154 SE 579.

“All citizens of the United States of America have a right to pass and re-pass through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in their own state.” See Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283, 12 L Ed. 702.

Every citizen has an inalienable right to make use of the public highways of the state; every citizen has full freedom to travel from place to place in the enjoyment of life and liberty. People v Nothaus, 363 P.2d 180, 182 (Colo.-1961).

Definition of “Passenger: “One who is traveling, as in a public coach, or in a ship, or on foot. This is the usual, through corrupt orthography.” See American Dictionary Of The English Language By Noah Webster, 1828.

It is thus well established that the right to travel by an American/ citizen on the public roads is a fundamental and constitutional right and, in fact, inalienable and natural right, one inherent in an American/ citizen and secured by the Organic Law of the Land.

The concept that traveling upon the roads is a basis fundamental right of every citizen, i.e., American, in the land is not a new concept in law. The right of every person to freely travel on public ways is well grounded in the ancient common law:

A highway according to the common law, is a place in which all the people have a right to pass. A common street and public highway are the same, and any way which is common to all the people may be called a highway. Skinner v. Town of Weathersfield, 63 A. 142, 143; 78 Vt. 410.

At common law every member of the public has a right to use, in a reasonable manner and with due care, public roads, inclusive of public bridges. Shell Oil Co. v Jackson County , 193 S.W. 2d 268, 271 (Tex. Civ. App.-1946).

“In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 27 L. Ed. 2^nd 272, 92 S.Ct. 260, Brennan, joined by White and Marshall stated that for more than a century, the Supreme Court has recognized the constitutional right of all citizens to unhindered interstate travel and that both the existence of this right and its fundamental importance in America has been long been established beyond question.” Also see Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 31 Lawyer’s Edition 2nd 272, 92 S.Ct. 995, 56 Columbia L. Rev. 47.

“The rule is firmly established that the right of a citizen of one state to pass into any state of the Union . . . without molestation [restriction] is secured and protected by the United States Constitution.” See 16A Am Jur 2d 607 Page 550-6, Freedom to travel.

It has been held directly in a number of cases that at common law a driver of a vehicle has the right to drive upon any part of the highway. Boyer v North End Drayage Co., 67 S.W.2d 769, 770 (Mo. App.-1934).

The common law rule was that a public highway was a “way common and free to all the king’s subjects to pass and repass at liberty,” and this court recognized that the “right to travel a highway belongs to everybody in the state,. . .that a highway belongs to the public, and is free and common as a way to every citizen on the land.” House-Wives League v. City of Indianapolis, 204 Ind. 685, 688-89.

In quoting from some old English law books on the common law, the Tennessee Chancery Appeals Court stated the following:

Under the general law a public street is a public highway, and, if a highway, it is a “road which every citizen has a right to use.” The right of the citizen to pass and repass on it is limited to no particular part of it for, as said in the books, “the public are entitled not only to a free passage along the highway, but to a free passage along any portion of it not in the actual use of some other traveler.” 1 Hawk. P.C. 22; Ang. & D. Highways, ' 226. *** Under the common law a public highway was “a way common and free to all the king’s subjects to pass and repass at liberty.” State v. Stroud 52 S.W. 697, 698 (Tenn.-1899); Also see, 3 Kent, Comm. 432

The complete freedom and common right to travel on the highways is so old and well established that it has never been questioned, until this century. The general recognition of this right is due to its fundamental importance in our civilized society. It thus is a fundamental right that was secured by both Federal and State constitutions.

There can be no denial of the general proposition hat every citizen of the United States, and every citizen of each state of the Union, as an attribute of personal liberty, has the right ordinarily, of free transit from, or through the territory of any State. This freedom of egress or ingress is guaranteed to all by the clearest implications of the Federal, as well as of the State constitution. It has been said that even in England, whence our system of jurisprudence was derived, the right to personal liberty did not depend on any express statute, but “it was the birthright of every freeman.”-Cooley’s Const. Lim. 342.

This right was said by Sir William Blackstone to consist in “the power of locomotion, of changing situation, or of moving one’s person to whatever place one’s inclination may direct, without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due process of law.” 1 Bl. Comm. 134 Joseph v. Randolph, 71 Ala. 499, 504-505.

The use of roads for travel is a very ancient practice. The right to travel upon them has been recognized since the early Roman Empire. This right to freely travel as an attribute of personal liberty was so basic and fundamental in early America that it never became the subject matter of colonial legislation. Not even under the tyranny of King George III was the right to travel suppressed. Liberty was recognized and secured by all of the original state constitutions. When Connecticut was a Colony, its citizens possessed this liberty and right to travel. The Constitution of Connecticut when adopted secured this inalienable right to liberty, locomotion, or travel on the public ways.

That the lower court/tribunal and Appellee should then ignore and trample over the meaning and original intent of the State Constitution and recognize only current statutes set by quasi legislation, is not only being legally nearsighted but is a gross violation of their oath of office. As a result the trial court/tribunal gravely erred in its decision. The liberty to travel and to move from place to place, which existed under the common law, and which existed in colonial America, also exists under the State Constitutions. The “liberty” in the Constitution secures the same rights it included at common law and meaning the same thing-a right to travel”

Freedom of locomotion, although subject to proper restrictions, is included in the >liberty’ guaranteed by State Constitution. Commonwealth v. Doe, 167 A. 241, 242: 109 Pa. Super. 187.

This inalienable and constitutional right to travel on public roads includes the use of an automobile as a means of conveyance. Since the invention of the automobile the courts of this land have universally recognized the automobile not only as a lawful means of conveyance, but one that has equal rights with other modes of travel using public ways:

The law does not denounce motor carriages, as such, on public ways.* * * they have an equal right with other vehicles in common use to occupy the streets and roads.* * * It is improper to say that the driver of the horse has rights in the roads superior to the driver of the automobile. Both have the right to use the easement. Indiana Springs Co. v. Brown, 165 Ind. 465, 468.

The right to make use of an automobile as a vehicle of travel long the highways of the state, is no longer an open question. The owners thereof have the same rights in the roads and streets as the drivers of horses or those riding a bicycle or traveling in some other vehicle. House v. Cramer, 112 N.W. 3; 134 Iowa 374; Farnsworth v. Tampa Electric Co. 57 So. 233, 237, 62 Fla. 166.

Automobiles have the right to use the highways of the State on an equal footing with other vehicles. Cumberland Telephone. & Telegraph Co. v Yeiser, 141 Ky. 15.

Each citizen has the absolute right to choose for himself the mode of conveyance he desires, whether it be by wagon or carriage, by horse, motor or electric car, or by bicycle, or astride of a horse, subject to the sole condition that he will observe all those requirements that are known as the law of the road. Swift v City of Topeka, 43 Kansas 671, 674.

A farmer has the same right to the use of the highways of the state, whether on foot or in a motor vehicle, as any other citizen. Draffin v. Massey, 92 S.E.2d 38, 42.

There can be no question of the right of automobile owners to occupy and use the public streets of cities, or highways in the rural districts. Liebrecht v. Crandall, 126 N.W. 69, 110 Minn. 454, 456.

The automobile may be used with safety to others users of the highway, and in its proper use upon the highways there is an equal right with the users of other vehicles properly upon the highways. The law recognizes such right of use upon general principles. Brinkman v Pacholike, 84 N.E. 762, 764, 41 Ind. App. 662, 666.

Automotive vehicles are lawful means of conveyance and have equal rights upon the streets with horses and carriages. Chicago Coach Co. v. City of Chicago, 337 Ill. 200, 205; See also: Christy v. Elliot, 216 Ill. 31; Ward v. Meredith, 202 Ill. 66; Shinkle v. McCullough, 116 Ky. 960; Butler v. Cabe, 116 Ark. 26, 28-29.

Though, as we have said, automobiles are lawful vehicles and have equal rights on the highways with horses and carriages. Daily v. Maxwell, 133 S.W. 351, 354. Matson v. Dawson, 178 N.W. 2d 588, 591.

A traveler has an equal right to employ an automobile as a means of transportation and to occupy the public highways with other vehicles in common use. Campbell v. Walker, 78 Atl. 601, 603, 2 Boyce (Del.) 41.

There is no distinction made by these authorities (and many others) in the mode of travel a citizen chooses to use on a public way. A citizen has the same inalienable right to travel on a public road by use of an automobile as another citizen does traveling on foot or bicycle thereon:

A highway is a public way open and free to any one who has occasion to pass along it on foot or with any kind of vehicle. Schlesinger v. City of Atlanta, 129 S.E. 861, 867, 161 Ga. 148, 159; Holland v. Shackelford, 137 S.E. 2d 298, 304, 220 Ga. 104; Stavola v. Palmer, 73 A.2d 831, 838, 136 Conn. 670

Persons may lawfully ride in automobiles, as they may lawfully ride on bicycles. Doherty v. Ayer, 83 N.E. 677, 197 Mass. 241, 246; Molway v. City of Chicago, 88 N.E. 485, 486, 239 Ill. 486; Smiley v. East St. Louis Ry. Co., 100 N.E. 157, 158.

The owner of an automobile has the same right as the owner of other vehicles to use the highway,* * * A traveler on foot has the same right to the use of the public highways as an automobile or any other vehicle. Simeone v. Lindsay, 65 Atl. 778, 779; Hannigan v. Wright, 63 Atl. 234, 236.

A traveler on foot has the same right to use of the public highway as an automobile or any other vehicle. Cecchi v. Lindsay, 75 Atl. 376, 377, 1 Boyce (Del.) 185.

To further qualify the right to travel on the public roads by way of an automobile, several courts have made the obvious connection between its use and that of a constitutional liberty or as an individual right. This could only be the natural conclusion: If traveling per se is an inalienable and constitutional right, and if the automobiles has “equal rights” with the older forms of travel such as on foot or horseback, the logical deduction here is that traveling by way of an automobile on a public way is a constitutional, inalienable, and fundamental right:

The use of the automobile as a necessary adjunct to the earning of a livelihood in modern life requires us in the interest of realism to conclude that the right to use an automobile on the public highways partakes of the nature of a liberty within the meaning of the constitutional guarantees of which the citizen not be deprived without due process of law. Berberian v. Lussier, 139 A.2d 869, 872; 87 R.I. 226, 231 (1958). See also: Schecter v. Killingsworth, 380 P.2d 136, 140; 93 Ariz. 273 (1963).

The right to operate a motor vehicle [an automobile] upon the public streets and highways is not a mere privilege. It is a right of liberty, the enjoyment of which is protected by the guarantees of the federal and state constitutions. Adams v. City of Pocatello, 416 P.2d 46, 48; 91 Idaho 99 (1966).

The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways* * *includes the right in so doing to use the ordinary and usual conveyances of the day; and under the existing modes of travel includes the right to drive a horse-drawn carriage or wagon thereon, or to operate an automobile thereon, for the usual and ordinary purposes of life and business.* * *The rights aforesaid, being fundamental, are constitutional rights. Teche Lines v. Danforth, 12 So.2d 784, 787 (Miss.-1943). See also Thompson v. Smith, supra.

Thus, there can be no question that the defendant has an inherent, constitutional, and inalienable right to travel in his automobile on the public roads and streets, whether in Connecticut or anywhere else in the several states in Union. Will This court/tribunal admit that the defendant has a constitutional right to travel in his automobile or state that the defendant has not a right to use the streets and highways for travel without a driver’s license (not for gain)? Will it become obvious that this lower court/tribunal avoided the facts and preferred not to recognize the true nature of the defendant’s vested and constitutional rights in this case?

The liberty to travel in this land is interwoven into the fabric of the Organic Law of the United States of America and Connecticut. It is one of our most sacred and fundamental rights. It thus is one that can never be attacked, violated, suppressed, or destroyed by any level or branch of government. This would be in total defiance and contradiction to the very purpose our form of government was established, that being to secure such inherent and natural rights:

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness-That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed... The Declaration of Independence-1776.

It is apparent the lower court has grossly underestimated the broad spectrum of rights that are encompassed in the terms “inalienable rights” or Constitutional Rights,” along with their meaning and origin. These rights, being a gift of God, were secured by the Constitution of Connecticut, and cannot be dissolved away by legislative acts. Every inherent and inalienable right at common law, and which is in existence to date, when our constitution was adopted:

The office and purpose of the constitution is to shape and fix the limits of government activity. It thus proclaims, safeguards and preserves in basic form the pre-existing laws, rights, mores, habits and modes of thought and life of the people as developed under the common law and as existing at the time of its adoption to the extent and as therein stated. Dean v. Paolicelli, 72 S.E. 2d 506, 510; 194 Va. 219 (1952).

Hence, it may be said with great propriety, that a constitution “measures the powers of the rules, but it does not measure the rights of the governed;” that is not the origin of rights, nor the fountain of law-but it is the “framework of the political government, and necessarily based upon the pre-existing condition of laws, rights, habits, modes of thought.” Cooley Con. Lim., 37 Atchison & Nebraska R.R. Co. v. Baty, 6 Neb. 37, 41.

The rights of the individual are not derived from governmental agencies, either municipal, state, or federal, or even from the Constitution. They exist inherently in every man, by endowment of the Creator, and are merely reaffirmed in the Constitution, and restricted only to the extent that they have been voluntarily surrendered by the citizenship to the agencies of government. The people’s rights are not derived from the government, but the government’s authority comes from the people. The Constitution but states again these rights already existing, and when legislative encroachment by the nation, state, or municipality invade these original and preserved rights, it is the duty of the courts to so declare, and to afford the necessary relief. City of Dallas et al. v. Mitchell, 245 S.W. 944, 945-46 (Tex-1922).