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To the prosecutor: Please take notice that at the venue designated in the caption, or at such other time and the court shall order, I will ask the court to dismiss this case before I make a plea. My motion is made on the basis of the argument set forth herein and such other arguments as I shall make in an amended motion should one be necessary.

When I was a child I was run over by a car injuring my head. Then later as a child I was run over by another car injuring my head. As an adult I fell from the 2^nd floor - on my head. Those 3 head injuries cause me some problems. I did not learn to read until age 23 after finally being instructed by special teachers who understood my problem. In the year 1997 I went to Gramma’s funeral in St. Ignace county and while there I was falsely accused of a sexual crime. I was then factually innocent.

The sex registration act was declared unconstitutional. That is my opinion based on my reading and based on many discussions with lawyers. A Michigan federal court declared it unconstitutional on June 3, 2002. Here is a link to the opinion/ case declaring the law unconstitutional. http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/5441.html On February 23, 2004 (almost 2 years later) the federal court of appeal overturned the opinion of Judge Victoria Roberts regarding the unconstitutionality of the registration act - but my case is better than the case of Daniel Fullmer.

On Tuesday, January 27, 2004, I presented 3 written motions on Judge Alston’s court. Judge Alston is blind and could not read the motions himself. It was in Judge Alston’s court because when my lawyer set the hearing the clerks kept it a secret from him that Judge Alston is blind. The 3 motions were:

1 A motion to revoke Jennifer Barns’s request for testing. The court may not have realized that this was not a court ordered testing except to the extent that the court granted the request of Jennifer Barnes, a request that was without my consent.

Two of those motions are mostly moot now, but the suppression motion was simply ignored. I had a right to review that on appeal by extraordinary writ prior to my plea. That right was jeopardized by the court’s failure to even file the motion. However, I did give it to the court recorder. The court recorder and the judge left the room. They made no record of their having scorned me and my motions.

Judge Alston then unfairly raised my bail to $100,000 - excessive bail. This case was not on for a bail review. Judge Alston put me in jail until I agreed to plead guilty in order to get out of jail. That was on 27 January. Then about a month later, on February 23^rd, Judge Victoria’s opinion was overruled. So now I know - but I contend that the sex offender registration law is unconstitutional. My case is different and my lawyer has argued more and is better issues than the lawyer who lost his case at the court of appeal.

Arthur Schupback (a relative of my father by my father’s remarriage) visited Judge Alston to inquire as to the excessive bail. The clerk intercepted Art and refused to let him talk to the judge. She told him it was none of his business and to “stay out of it”.

Within 48 hours of my having been jailed by Judge Alston my lawyer faxed papers to the higher court only to be told by a newbie lawyer/clerk that the court recorder in Judge Alston’s court has already told this lawyer/clerk all about the case. This lawyer/clerk said that she would

I am a peaceful person. I always show up in court. There was no reason for that bail except to make me plead guilty to get out of jail after 90 days.

I am dealing with two cases simultaneously here. The two cases have the common thread of being the product of a policeman “out to get me” . Grace Olech v Village of Willowbrook, et. al. (1998 7th circuit) www.lawyerdude.8m.com/5126.html 160 F.3d 386 and Esmail v. Macrane (7^th Circuit 1995) 53 F.3d 176 both hold that ”out to get you" is actionable against a government.

The same policeman who broke out my car windows is the one who was at my house 20 times to harass me for being on the sex offender list.

I, Douglas Palaschak, declare the following under penalty of perjury: I have 20 years experience as an Attorney specializing in bankruptcy, constitutional law, criminal law including drug, sex, and traffic cases, and cases pertaining to the struggle of the individual human against the stealthy encroachment of the government bureaucracy. I am an expert in the standards of effectiveness of appointed counsel. I wrote an improved standard by which to measure effectiveness of counsel. I call it a defendant’s bill of rights. Here is a link to my improved standard: http://www.circuitlawyer.8m.com/5635.html

I may or may not apply to appear pro hac vice in this case but any person may apply as next friend - as I did - for an extraordinary writ as a remedy for excessive fail imposed by a judge who was not authorized to raise bail. Judge Alston was not authorized to raise bail. He gets his authorization by a motion from either side - except at the arraignment. I was flabbergasted at the outrageous and illegal actions of Judge Alston and his court recorder - who told me that she was a court reporter - and their co-conspirator clerk/lawyer at the next higher court.

I have come to know Ron quite well through numerous emails ( sometimes 3 or more in a single day) and telephone calls. I have talked to several members of his family. I can find nobody who has anything bad to say about Ron. He is a hard worker, kind, generous to a fault (having lost money by letting a man use Ron’s credit card to buy paint). He is not a violent person nor a sex offender. Ron studies constitutional law and sends me some case or quote nearly everyday. He feels strongly that he has suffered abuse and neglect in his legal cases and I agree with him.

Art Schupback has complained to the office of the Attorney General regarding this outrageous bail of $100,000 used to extract a plea from Ron. Ron pled after 90 days of being unable to raise $10,000 to pay a bondsman and having insufficient collateral to back up a bail bond. As soon as I find out where to send a complaint about Judge Alston I will be complaining also. We will also be filing in federal court under the “out to get me “ theory of Grace Olech v Village of Willowbrook, et. al. (1998 7th circuit) www.lawyerdude.8m.com/5126.html 160 F.3d 386 and Esmail v. Macrane (7^th Circuit 1995) 53 F.3d 176. Both that ”out to get you" is actionable against a government. I make this statement to corroborate Ron’s story and to point out that Ron’s 2 cases stem from harassment triggered by stigma imposed by Ron’s picture having appeared on the internet in the registration site.

From what Ron has told me, his underlying sex case from 1997 is void due to constitutional infirmities.

He told me that he sent some files to me regarding the window smashing case and/or the 1997 underlying sex case.

Bates v Arizona http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/bates.html 1 (1977) 53 L Ed 2d 810. Legal Clinic Advertised. Subject: Overbreadth and 1^st amendment. Advertising was a violation of the state bar act - just as serious as practicing without a license - but the state bar act was declared unconstitutional. 2

Birbrower http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/birbrower.html 1 Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank v Superior Court (1998)17 Cal.4th 119 , 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 304; 949 P 2^nd eroding the California state bar act.
2

Keyishian v Board of Regents (1967) 17 L Ed 2d 629, 385 U.S. 589. Another unconstitutional registration act. Peddler registration. Infirmity: Overbreadth. Ordinance required solicitors to register with the police. Ruled unconstitutional. 1

In Griffin v Illinois (1956), 100 L Ed 891, 351 US 12, 79 S Ct 585, 55 ALR2d 1055 http://www.circuitlawyer.8m.com/griffin.html , Justice Douglas, speaking for a unanimous court, said that a defendant deserves due process at every stage of the criminal proceeding.

“Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious discriminations.” - Justice Douglas in Griffin v Illinois 1956.

Ron deserves his full panoply of constitutional rights at the pre-plea stage - which means that he has a right to argue the defects in the complaint and in the law before he enters a plea.

The Irrebuttable Presumption in this statute is unconstitutional and void ab initio.

Michigan’s Sex Offenders Registration Act, MCLA 28.721 et seq, ("SORA") violates the constitutional protection against irrebuttable presumptions. See Cleveland Board of Education v La Fleur (1974) 414 US 632, 39 L Ed 2d 52, 94 S Ct 791. http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/5877.html In the Le Fleur case the irrebuttable presumption was that pregnant women were not suitable to teach school.

Michigan’s sex offender registration law is overbroad. This renders the law unconstitutional ab initio. Overbreadth is the single most powerful constitutional law concept. I can be used to combat the oppression of bad laws. Definition of Overbreadth: Excessive breadth of a statute that vests unbridled discretion in the police which in turns invites the terrorist tactics used by the Bay City police against Ron Fox. Inevitable the overbroad law is used as an instrument of oppression resulting in encroachment on lawful speech or activity by police enforcing the statute. A related concept is vagueness. Overbreadth renders the statute unconstitutional - but only if you raise the issue.

The most famous overbreadth case is that of the Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth, Shuttlesworth v Birmingham (1965) Volume15 of Lawyer's Edition 2^nd page 176, 382 U.S. 87 86 S Ct 211 : http://laws.findlaw.com/us/382/87.html . ( Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth has 4 opinions under his name in the reports of the U.S. Supreme court. The best of the 4 is the overbreadth case.) It case stands for the proposition that vague statutes vest unbridled discretion in the police. Justice Douglas says:

“Literally read, therefore, the second part of this ordinance says that a person may stand on a public sidewalk in Birmingham only at the whim of any police officer of that city. The constitutional vice of so broad a provision needs no demonstration. It "does not provide for government by clearly defined laws, but rather for government by the moment-to-moment opinions of a policeman on his beat."

This case proves that overbreadth applies to statutes that don't even deal with speech. The moment to moment opinions of a police officer rings true considering the many harassing visits by the Bay city police to Ron’s house before they broke the windows out of his van.

1. Birbrower http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/birbrower.html Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank v Superior Court (1998)17 Cal.4th 119 , 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 304; 949 P 2^nd eroding the California state bar act. This case may not mention overbreadth but the state bar act is way overbroad.

2. Shuttlesworth v Birmingham http://www.lawyerdude.8m.com/5409.html is, of course, a superb overbreadth case proving that actions as well as speech trigger overbreadth protection.

3. Bates v Arizona http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/bates.html (1977) 53 L Ed 2d 810. Legal Clinic Advertised. Subject: Overbreadth and 1^st amendment. Advertising was a violation of the state bar act - just as serious as practicing without a license - but the this anti-speech provision of the state bar act was declared unconstitutional.

4. Condon, Estate of http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/condon.html (__1998) 65 Cal App 4th 1138, 76 Cal Rptr 2d 922. For years the bar would not permit unlicensed lawyers to be heard if they attempted to collect money for fees. These lawyers took the bar to task and won! Once again a provision of the state bar act fell when its constitutionality was challenged.

5. Baird v State Bar of Arizona (1970) 27 L Ed 2d 639, Superb Annotation @953 of 27 Lawyer's Edition 2^nd . Subject: Overbreadth. Bar applicant refused to answer question in bar application regarding his past to age 16 regarding membership in organizations advocating overthrow of government. Once again, a speech provision of the state bar act was held unconstitutional.

6. Cohen v California http://www.lawyerdude.8k.com/fuckthedraft.html (1971) 30 L Ed 2d 124. "Fuck the draft" written on the back of jacket in court hallway. Overbreadth was the basis of this decision.

7. Hackin v Lockwood (1966) 361 F2d 499. District court held that Arizona's ABA requirement is constitutional. The court skirted the issue by holding that requiring graduation from an accredited school is constitutional - avoiding completely the issue that ABA requirements were instituted at the behest of Carnegie, a paradigm robber baron, and foisted upon the public in the age of the robber barons with the obvious effect of promoting corporate ficta and limiting the practice of law and even the teaching of law to the wealthy. We can see the folly now in retrospect with the multitude of non-ABA schools in California.

8. Hackin v Arizona http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/hackin.html (1967)19 L. Ed. 2d 347; 389 U.S. 143; 88 S. Ct. 325. Overbreadth case. There was no written majority opinion. Douglas's strong and cogent dissent shames the majority in this case. Lawyer Hackin having been denied admission to the Arizona bar nonetheless defended a guy who was denied counsel by the court because the proceeding was, hypertechnically, civil in nature, habeas corpus. Hackin stepped forward where bar volunteers failed to do so, defended the otherwise defenseless, and was prosecuted for practicing without a license. Maybe he failed to write a good brief - although he persuaded Justice Douglas.

9. Doran v Salem Inn (1975) 45 L Ed 2d 648. Overbreadth. 3 stripper bars. Ballet Africanus. Leading case.

10. Erznoznik v City of Jacksonville http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/erzoznik.html 45 L Ed 2d__. Overbreadth. Baby's butt argument regarding drive in theater. The statute was declared unconstitutional because it was so broad as to include the depiction of a baby's butt which the court felt, would not be offensive to anybody.

11. Ficker v Curran 950 F Supp 123, Affirmed at 119 F3d 1150. Attorney solicitation. Overbreadth regarding bar acts regulating attorneys. Attorney solicitation law was held unconstitutional. Used in my brief 3596 at page 10 which brief is here: http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/3596.html

12. Houston v Hill http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/houston.html (1987) 96 L Ed 2d 390. Our friend Ed Heimlich from Houston knows this guy Ray Hill. “Pick on somebody your own size” are the words that triggered an illegal arrest. Overbreadth. Famous Texan Charles Alan Wright argued this case. "Interview" with police as they were chasing a suspect. Defendant said "Why don't you pick on somebody your own size!" The statements were not fighting words or obscenity. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the guy shouting at police as they were chasing a suspect. It is okay to be provocative. Any non-speech was pre-empted by state statute. Extrapolation from Houston case: With regard to laws against attorneys speaking without license: Any non-truth is pre-empted by fraud statutes. Any truth is protected by the 1st amendment. The supreme Court said that the city "had numerous opportunities to narrow and has not done so." Similarly the state bar act suffers from overbreadth and the implied and also explicit ambiguity of defining what constitutes the practice of law. Similarly Michigan has had ample opportunity to fix this defective registration act.

13. Keyishian v Board of Regents (1967) 17 L Ed 2d 629, 385 U.S. 589. Another unconstitutional registration act. Peddler registration. Infirmity: Overbreadth. Ordinance required solicitors to register with the police. Ruled unconstitutional. This was a registration act for public safety - just the same thing that Ron is facing - an overbroad registration act that invites just the type of unbridled discretion that Ron suffers today by this prosecution.

14. McSurely v Ratliff (1967) 282 F Supp 848 (E.D. Ky. 1967). Anti communist law. Raid. Court declared Kentucky's anti sedition law unconstitutional. Case arose from overbreadth, an unjustified raid based on an overbroad statute. See McSurely v McClellan (1976) 553 F2d 1277, 1282, note 9 (D.C. Cir. 1976)(en banc) discussing a safekeeping order for the personal diaries and other seized items of McSurely. The case ordering the return of the documents of McSurelys is McSurely v Ratliff(1968) 398 F2d 817 (6th Cir 1968). The endnotes of In Our Defense contain an excellent brief regarding the search and seizure issues in a politically motivated raid.

Ron requests that this court dismiss his case and declare that SORA's registration and public disclosure scheme is an unconstitutional deprivation of his rights as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Background. This law is unconstitutional as having not arisen in our state house.

In 1994 Congress enacted, and the President signed, the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 2038 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 14071. The stated objective of the Act was "to assist law enforcement and protect the public from convicted child molesters and violent sex offenders through requirements of registration and appropriate release of registration information." 64 Fed.Reg. 572, 575 (1999). The law conditions the availability of federal Byrne grants upon the creation of state sex offender registration programs. See 42 U.S.C. 14071(f)(2)(A). It required the registration of persons convicted of offenses listed in the statute, defined as offenses which include "criminal offenses against a victim who is a minor" and "sexually violent offenses." 42 U.S.C. 14071(a)(1). States were given three years from September 1, 1994, to comply. See 42 U.S.C. 14071(f)(1). The original version of the law required that the information compiled by states was to be treated as private, except that: A. such information could be disclosed to law enforcement agencies for law enforcement purposes; B. such information could be disclosed to government agencies conducting confidential background checks; and C. the designated State law enforcement agency and any local law enforcement agency authorized by the State agency could disclose relevant information necessary to protect the public concerning a specific person required to register under the law with some limitations.

Hysterical overreaction. Megan’s laws are on the way out. Let’s accelerate the trend.

The initiative for sex offender registration and notification systems was triggered in large part by the sexual assault and murder of Megan Kanka, a seven year old girl in New Jersey. She was murdered by an individual living across the street from her who had been previously convicted of sex crimes involving young girls. This is called an "offense-based" registry. Several states have adopted "offender-based" registries, where offenders are classified based on their perceived likelihood to commit future crimes. The registration and notification requirements of different classes of offenders tend to vary based on their perceived danger to the community. See 42 U.S.C. 14071(d). In 1996, Congress amended the law to provide that registry information may be disclosed for any permissible state law purpose, and that information shall be released when necessary to protect the public. In addition, the reference indicating that the information was considered private was removed. See 42 U.S.C. 14071(d) (amended 1996). Michigan adopted its version of "Megan's Law" in 1994, Public Act. 1994, No. 295, Eff. Oct 1, 1995. The original version of the Act required registration of certain categories of sex offenders and gave law enforcement officials some discretion to conduct community notification. Subsequent amendments of the Act expanded categories of offenders required to register and eliminated restrictions on public access to registration information. In 1999, Public Act 1999, No. 85, Eff. Sept. 1, 1999, was enacted, again expanding the categories of offenses requiring registration. In addition, it required that information on all registrants be made publically available, including through the internet. The registry does not compile information and classify offenders based on their calculated danger to the community. Rather, all offenders who commit a listed offense are included.

The Act does not provide any means by which individuals required to register can contest the listing of their information in the Registry. The Registry's information is provided to the public through the Department of State Police Sex Offender Registry website, www.mipsor.state.mi.us. Anyone with internet access can search the database of registered persons either by zip code, or by name. The name, gender, height, weight, race, eye color, date of birth, address, offense, and any known aliases of registered offenders are accessible by either method.

The registration requirement stigmatizes Ron as a sex offender; infringes numerous other interests; and, burdens him through a host of obligations over his entire life such that he is deprived of a liberty interest and entitled to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Ron Fox’s damage is not speculative and is more than mere damage to his reputation. Under the decisions in Wisconsin v. Constantineau 400 U.S. 433, 91 S.Ct. 507, 27 L Ed 2^nd 515 (1971) and Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L Ed 2^nd 405 (1976), reputation alone is not a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest. "Only where the damage to reputation is coupled with another interest, such as employment, is procedural due process triggered." A person making this claim must show that the government action deprived him of a right previously held under state law. See Paul, 424 U.S. at 708, 96 S.Ct. at 1164. This has come to be known as the "stigma plus" test. Catchall, 193 F.3d at 479, citing Levin v. Childers, 101 F.3d 44, 46 (6th Cir. 1996).

In Ron’s case 1) there was an utterance of a statement about Ron sufficiently derogatory to injure his reputation, that he claims is false and is capable of being proved false, and (2) that he has experienced a tangible and material state-imposed burden or that his or her legal status has been altered. See Doe v. Depot of Public Safety, 271 F.3d. 38, 47 (2nd Cir. 2001), citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L Ed 2^nd 405 (1976). Several circuits have adopted this as the "stigma plus" test. Id., citing Cannon v. City of West Palm Beach, 250 F.3d 1299, 1302 (11th Cir. 2001); Catchall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 479 (6th Cir. 1999); and WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 197 F.3d 367, 376 (9th Cir. 1999).

Ron Fox is not a dangerous sex offender and does not pose a threat to the safety to the community. Registration as a "sex offender" is required solely on the basis of a conviction for one of the offenses enumerated in the statute. MCLA 28.721 et seq. The Department of State Police does not conduct any assessment as to whether or not an individual such as Ron poses a threat to the safety of the community in order to determine whether or not that person is required to register pursuant to MCLA 28.721 et seq. Le Fleur, cited above, renders such a statutes unconstitutional being a denial of Due Process.

Michigan’s law is a Bill of pains and penalties - and therefore unconstitutional

The penalty is set by the legislature without possibility of judicial intervention. Persons convicted of a single offense defined as a "criminal sexual offense" must register for 25 years after the date of initially registering. MCLA 28.725(3). Persons required to register as "sexual offenders" are subject to possible felony prosecution for failure to comply with the legal obligations imposed by MCLA 28.721(1). The inappropriateness of this is obvious is you consider that Ron served no time for the previous offense.

Failure to comply with the registration provisions subjects persons required to register as "sexual offenders" to possible prosecution for a felony. MCLA 28.729(1).

Persons required to register as "sexual offenders" must comply with address verification procedures for their entire registration period unless registration is suspended by the Department of State Police while the person is incarcerated, under civil commitment, or residing outside Michigan. MCLA 28.721 et seq.

Persons required to register under MCLA 28.721 et seq. must submit an address verification form annually after their initial registration dates and/or an address verification form every ninety days after initial registration dates. MCLA28.721et seq.

Failure to return address verification forms or providing false registration information subjects registrants to possible arrest and prosecution for a felony. MCLA 28.721. et seq.

All persons required to register who change their address are required to register the new address in writing with the Department of State Police within 10 days of change. MCLA 28.721 et seq.

Failure to register a new address with the Michigan Department of State Police within 10 days subjects Ron to possible arrest and prosecution for a felony even thought the underlying alleged crime was so de minimis as to require no jail time. MCLA 28.721 et seq..

Upon information and belief, the State of Michigan does not impose registration requirements with criminal penalties on persons with criminal convictions who have completed their sentences other than persons required to register pursuant to MCLA 28.721 et seq.

Persons other than those required to register pursuant to MCLA 28.721 et seq. are not subject to possible arrest and felony prosecution for failure to have a photograph taken by the Michigan Department of State Police.

Upon information and belief, persons other than those required to register pursuant to MCLA 28.721 et seq., are not subject to possible arrest and felony prosecution for failure to have a photograph taken by the Michigan Department of State Police.

Public Dissemination of Information Regarding Persons Designated as Sex Offenders.

The statute, MCLA 28.728 et seq. does not provide any standards for a court to determine when dissemination of registration information is or is not required for public safety.

The Michigan Department of State Police sex offender registry does not provide sufficient information for members of the public to determine whether any particular person who appears on the registry poses a threat to public safety. Had Ron’s neighbors and the police known the true facts, they would not have stood in his yard and yelled that he was a sex offender - and they would not have followed him home and broke the windows out of his van.

The system of designating persons such as Ron as "sex offenders" as described above suggests to the public that Michigan law enforcement officials have determined that persons so designated pose a threat to public safety. However, registration is required solely on the basis of a conviction for one of the offenses listed in the statute. Widespread dissemination of a Ron’s designation as a "sex offender" and his identifying information occurs without any assessment of whether Ron in fact poses any danger to the community - despite unanimous opinion (among those who know Ron) that he is a safe, kind, hard working person. Even the putative victims will tell you that much.

Enforcement of MCLA 28.721 et seq., threatens the Ron with continuing irreparable injury for which there is no adequate remedy at law, including the following:

Ron faces possible felony prosecution if he fails to comply with the registration or address verification requirements of MCLA 28.721 et seq.

Ron has constitutionally protected liberty and property interest in not being falsely designated as a currently dangerous sex offender who poses a threat to the public safety.

The conduct of the police has stigmatized Ron as a currently dangerous sex offender without any procedure to determine whether there is any factual basis for labeling Ron as a threat to public safety.

In the case of Jennifer Simmer of Tempe, Arizona, this very Michigan statute led to her eviction for having brought her boyfriend from Michigan to live with her. Tempe police forced her eviction. Later she prevailed in her lawsuit but by then the damage was done. You can’t undo an eviction 2 years later.

This bad law has deprived Ron of his constitutionally protected liberty and property interests without due process of law in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution." In short, Ron alleges that the burden of his continuing obligation to register under the SORA, as well as the stigma he experiences by being listed in the registry, are sufficient to invoke procedural due process protections because he has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in not being falsely labeled as a dangerous sex offender and burdened by the legal requirements of the statute.

The stated purpose of the Michigan Department of State Police Sex Offender Registry ("PSOR") is "for the purpose of protecting the public," www.mispor.state.mi.us . However, registration serves this goal only if at least some of the registrants are likely to commit other sex offenses. Thus, the message conveyed by the PSOR is that at least some of the individuals in the PSOR are currently dangerous. The problem, however, is that the PSOR does not differentiate between those registrants who are currently dangerous, or likely to become dangerous again, and those who are not likely to become dangerous again.

Ron suffers the stigma associated with being falsely labeled as a danger to the community, by virtue of being included in the PSOR, constitutes government defamation of his reputation sufficient to meet the "stigma" prong of the "stigma plus" test. The holdings of other courts that have considered this issue support Ron's argument. See Doe v. Depot of Public Safety, 271 F.3d 38, 49 (2nd Cir. 2001) ("publication of the registry implies that each person listed is more likely than the average person to be currently dangerous . . . this implication stigmatizes every person listed on the registry"); Doe v. Anthony Williams, 167 F.Supp.2d at 51("it is beyond dispute that public notification pursuant to the [D.C. sex offender registry] results in stigma"). Thus, Ron has sufficiently met the first prong of the "stigma plus" test. This finding is bolstered by the fact that the Michigan website, unlike the Connecticut website in Doe v. Depot of Public Safety, does not contain any disclaimer informing the public that no assessment has been made regarding the risk of recidivism, or the current dangerousness, of any individual listed. The Court in Catchall, however, held that reputation alone is not a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest. Ron must make an additional showing that government action has deprived him of a right previously held under state law. Ron can demonstrate that he previously had a right to live in his house without 20 police raids and the police smashing the window of his van and then arresting him for attacking the police.

Ron asserts that several "plus" factors support his entitlement to procedural due process claim. Two of Ron's "plus" factors, loss of employment opportunities and possibility of future physical harm, have been rejected by other courts but Ron has additional factors. He has already suffered 20 raids on his house by the very police officer who subsequently smashed the window of Ron’s van thereby imposing on Ron the threat of being injured by glass or even shot.

Several courts have found that this is a sufficient "plus" factor to establish a procedural due process violation. In Doe v. Depot of Pubic Safety, 271 F.3d 38, 57 (2nd Cir. 2001), the court found that the registration duties imposed by Connecticut's sex offender law altered the legal status of the offenders, and thus constituted a sufficient 'plus' factor under the Paul v. Davis test. Similar to the SORA, the Connecticut Act requires that offenders update their addresses for an extended period. Based on the severity of their offense, some offenders have to update their information more frequently than others. Offenders who fail to comply with the Act are subject to criminal penalties. In addition, offenders are required to provide physical evidence to the registry, including blood samples and photographs. The court found that these requirements were extensive and onerous. More importantly, however, the court found that because offenders were obligated to comply, under penalty of law, the Act altered their legal status. 271 F.3d 38, 57.

The court reached this conclusion only after thoroughly reviewing the stigma plus requirement for procedural due process as it has developed in case law. 271 F.3d at 51-53. After analyzing this history, the court held: a person in Ron’s situation establishes a 'plus' factor for the purposes of the Paul v. Davis 'stigma plus' test only if he or she points to an indicia of material government involvement unique to the government's public role that distinguishes his or her claim from a traditional state law defamation suit. 271 F.3d at 56.

The Second Circuit held that the statutory registration requirements were sufficient to establish stigma plus because they altered the registrant's legal status and were governmental in nature, thus distinguishing it from the type of suit that could be brought in state court for defamation. The imposition of onerous duties that, if disregarded subjected to a felony prosecution, was sufficient to constitute a change in legal status and were "quintessentially" governmental in nature. 271 F.3d at ___.

Other district courts have found the "stigma plus" requirement satisfied based on the same reasoning. See Doe v. Anthony Williams, 167 F.Supp.2d 45, 51 (D. D.C. 2001); Doe v. Pataki, 3 F.Supp.2d 456, 468 (S.D. N.Y. 1998).

Offenders are required to fully comply with these registration requirements for at least 25 years.

In Catchall, the court held that the registration process did not constitute a physical restraint on liberty because it was not punishment. 193 F.3d at 478. The court did not address the alteration in legal status in finding that the process itself was not a restraint on liberty. And, the argument is not that the registration process constitutes an infringement on Ron's liberty interest by itself; rather, it is used to support his claim of injury to his reputation as a "plus" factor.

It would be a pyrrhic victory for Ron to win his case on appeal - or even at trial - as Douglas Palaschak did in 1999 after waiting in jail for 4 months for a trial for writing a petition. That is why due process requires that this issue be resolved prior to Ron’s plea. You can’t give him back those days in jail.

Ron plant to file a federal challenge but this court is obligated to deal with that same issue here.

Ron will also ask that his underlying judgment be vacated as the product of fraud, oppression, and ineffective counsel.

Ron will seek to enjoin the dissemination of registry information - but he has a right to a remedy at this stage of the proceeding..

Since the public notification and registration provisions of the SORA implicate liberty interests deserving due process protection, sufficient procedural safeguards must be afforded to Ron.. See e.g. Doe v. Pataki, 3 F.Supp.2d 456, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Doe v. Anthony Williams, 167 F.Supp.2d 45, 58 (D.D.C. 2001). Due process minimally requires notice and an opportunity to be heard. Mathews v Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 902, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976).

If the department store may not reclaim the gas stove of Mrs. Fuentes without a hearing and Due Process then surely the state may not impose a 25 year registration burden on Ron without a hearing and some Due Process and fairness considerations.

"The Supreme Court has explained that the central meaning of procedural due process is that ‘parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order to enjoy that right they must first be notified. It is equally fundamental [that these rights] must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'" - Fuentes v Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 1994, 32 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1972) (quoting Baldwin v Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall) 223, 233, 17 L. Ed. 531 (1863), and Armstrong v Menz, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S. Ct. 1187, 1191, 14 L. Ed 2d 62 (l965)).

And, as was the case with the Doe v. Anthony Williams, 167 F.Supp.2d 45, 58-59 (D.D.C. 2001) (District of Columbia); Doe v. Pataki, 3 F.Supp.2d 456, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (New York); Doe v. Attorney General, 426 Mass. 136, 146, 686 N.E.2d 1007, 1014 (Mass. 1997) (Massachusetts). Connecticut SORA [as well as the SORAs in the District of Columbia, New York, and Massachusetts6], Michigan's SORA must be invalidated (as it was in Arizona state court in the Simms case) because it provides no opportunity to be heard on whether, and to what extent, public notification of sex offenders' registry information is necessary to protect the public, and the extent to which the registration requirements should burden sex offenders, when balanced against the need to protect the public.

While it can be said that "it is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people," Doe v. Anthony Williams, 167 F.Supp.2d 45, 59 (D.D.C. 2001) (quoting United States v Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69, 70 S.Ct. 430, 94 L ED. 653 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)), the sex offenders who must register under the SORA are still entitled to due process under the Constitution: a procedure for determining the factual basis for, and legality of, the governmental action designed to deprive them of their liberty interests. Because sex offender registrants are not afforded that, the law under which Ron is now being prosecuted is void ab initio. The law violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

While these prior decisions have upheld the notification provisions of the SORA against due process challenges, none addressed the specific arguments made by Ron here:

3. Plus the latest technical wording: that the reputation damage resulting from registration as a sex offender, coupled with the ongoing legal obligations of registration and the attendant criminal penalties for failure to fulfill the obligations of registration, alter the registrant's legal status, and, therefore, the "stigma plus" test is met and his right to be free from government defamation entitles him to the procedural safeguards under the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Ron has sufficiently demonstrated a liberty interest recognized by the United States Constitution which is deserving of minimal due process protection, because of the damage to reputation as a labeled sex offender, coupled with the burden and duty of continuing registration obligations over a course of years.

Because the SORA does not provide notice to registrants or an opportunity to be heard, this court must, under the command or the 14^th amendment - refrain from enforcing it.

“No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges of citizens of the United States.” - the Privileges and Immunities clause of the 14^th amendment.

I, Gail Fox, declare the following under penalty of perjury: On Thursday, June 10, 2004 I served this motion #6464 at the office of the prosecutor. Thereafter I filed it at the criminal filing window. It was (circle one) rejected/ accepted and filed stamped.